All,
For "burger counts":
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(July 7, 2003)
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(June 17, 2004)
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(September 21, 2004)
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(December 27, 2004)
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(December 20, 2005)
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(February 28, 2006)
And now, AMI...
AMIS:
FY 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 $$ 326M 345M 454M 517M 504M SA 0 0 96.7M 119M 110.4M
So, let me get this right, in 20 years, they have converted 3,000 FPGA designs to ASICs.
And, in the last three years they have redefined part of their business segment, and called it 'Structured ASICs', and revenues were down this year from last.
Anyway you cut it, it doesn't look pretty.
The gross margins also look rough (anyone out there ever worked for a company with ~ 40% GM? not fun at all...bring your own hand towels time).
That makes structures ASICs flat to down for 2004 to 2005 for AMI.
This is similar to MacDonalds giving the bizillionth customer who orders a prize -- it tells you nothing, other than someone got lucky. Now a history of increasing 'burger counts', that at least tells you something.
In this case, the 3,000th conversion customer got lucky: they got a working part!
In all fairness, more power to AMI: they have been in this business for a very long time, and they obviously know how to make money in it.
The other link for the FPGA journal is much more interesting (Kevin is pretty sharp!): (from his article)
(when asked 'is structured dead...')
"Our answer to these questions is an emphatic "no." The reasons behind LSI's strategy shift are complex and somewhat company-specific. No company can do everything at once and do it well, and smart executives know how and when to focus their company's energies on the projects that will bring the most return and growth and that capitalize on the organization's unique strengths. LSI had good momentum and competence in the storage and consumer markets, and those made sense as a place to focus the company's remaining resources in a difficult business situation."
I call this the 'apologia' as it is the restatement of the company line why they left the business (even though they were #1). LSI found the business did not fit. It happens.
"The part of the situation that isn't company specific is the orthogonal trend toward domain-specific optimization of silicon platforms. This specialization can be seen across industries and across silicon technologies. With the exception of full-blown ASIC, every customizable silicon technology makes some serious technical compromises. For FPGAs, these compromises are obvious in the LUT fabric which gives away an order of magnitude or so in speed, density, and power consumption for the privilege of reprogrammability. In structured ASIC and in non-volatile FPGA technologies like antifuse, the configurable fabric penalty is smaller, but still significant. Every vendor's solution to this problem is the same ? create ASIC-like hard IP blocks for critical functions."
Here Kevin answers the reasons why (that he artfully dodged earlier), without saying that LSI realized it was failing. He basically says: this business is really tough! You never have the right mix of IP, etc. Back to Kevin:
"Hard IP can take large, performance-critical hardware, like multipliers, memory, and high-speed I/O standards, and implement them much more efficiently than a designer attempting to put that same capability in the programmable or customizable part. This gain comes at a cost, however. Every customer that doesn't use a particular function that is hard-wired on the chip is essentially paying for wasted silicon. The juggling act for semiconductor companies, therefore, is to decide which functions (and how many) should be hardened in order to give the best mix of performance and cost optimization. For example, if your customers are doing high-speed digital signal processing (DSP), it probably pays to put a number of hard-wired multipliers on your chip. Even then, however, the question of "how many" poses a challenge. Do you need ten? A hundred? A thousand? The particular application area determines the answer."
So, the 'trick' is to know the customer, and know what 'works'. The way to tell if a company knows these things is to keep track of their financials.
Austin