usenet weirdness

What, you thought Boltzmann constant was a purely physical constant?

blahblahpipitiblah. And the predicte value of \alpha is?

Jan

Perhaps. Pauli was quite capable of debunking erroneous ones, and of suggesting useful ones.

You realise that all of this was a practical joke engineered by Georg Gamow?

Jan

You might also like Steven Nadler on Spinoza, and why he was so controversial, then and still. "A Book Forged In Hell". Theologians of various kinds were not merely 'interested'.

Ah, you have the right end?

Jan

Indeed, it could but it is very unlikely that it will.

Inventing catastrophes is easy. Why not let the Yellowstone super-volcano explode first?

Jan

As of the latest revision of the SI, Boltzmann's constant is just another conversion factor between units.

There is no longer any physical content to it,

Jan

Unzicker has studied Physics and has obtained a university diploma in Physics in 1985. Other than that, however, he is merely an author of popular-scientific books who, because of their content, is not taken seriously in the scientific community.

Incidentally, this particular book was self-published by Unzicker which for a book about science is always a bad sign as it was not peer-reviewed by a(nother) scientist before publication:

None of this has anything to do with the Brout--Englert--Higgs mechanism.

Unzicker's whole argument is a fallacy, and so is yours.

Modern probability theory has at least three problems, since Bayes rule is only for finite distributions and priors, the central limit theorem isn't uniformizing or polar limit theorem, and the error record is a long tail.

Modern mathematics has at least three definitions of continuous domain, at least three laws of large numbers, at least three Cantor spaces, at least three limit theorems in probability theory, at least two definitions of chance and uncertainty, and exactly one "time".

People usually associate the big-endians and little-endians with Gulliver's travels or notions of bit or byte order, yet there's also the big-end or little-end of the infinite series.

Duns Scotus has a lot of the interesting technical ideas that basically resolve to "infinity is in" and "infinity is one". A thing about the medieval philosophers vis-a-vis the ancient philosophers is that the medieval philosophers had the ancient philosophers, and we have both, and the benefit of the medieval philosopher's extended ruminations on the ancient philosophers.

I just don't believe that "men are natural enemies" like Spinoza or "men are born in a state of sin" like Calvin, it's not a sin to be a man, and not an excuse to violate the Mosaical laws to have neighbors.

Anyways Duns Scotus says some things that are more or less pertinent to the "canon" and "dogma" and "doctrine" of the technical philosophy, sort of "first".

Seems I've pointed out that Boltzmann constant gets "predicted" first, and it doesn't get "predicted" it gets "derived".

Mostly though it seems I point out that there's a true theory, _at all_, and exactly one of them. Then by definition that's it.

A "strong mathematical universe hypothesis" is a usual idea, naturally with a "clock hypothesis" and various other absolutes.

Nyah

So, it's its own butt?

The Boltzmann constant is provided to you in a little table.

Except that "etymology" is a word, and thus part of the language you are discussing - or in this case - misrepresenting.

More that he lied to himself.

Human beings make mistakes for all sorts of reasons. Cambridge intellectuals are particularly prone to discount ideas that weren't invented by other Cambridge intellectuals.

But software engineers need system engineers to make sure that all the tiny tiles do tesselate in a way that completely fills the area that needs to be covered. I've sat in on software reviews where that has been hammered out. I wouldn't sell myself as a system engineer, but I've worn the hat from time to time.

Obviously. Reducing a bright shiny simple idea to complicated practical hardware is what we do (when we are lucky). I spent more time tidying up the first attempts at practical hardware than I did reducing new ideas to practice.

That depends on how fast we cut our carbon emissions.

The catastrophes aren't invented. There was a massive sea level rise at the end of the last ice age (and every one before it) and the current distribution of continents that makes it possible for Antarctica and Greenland to be covered with deep ice sheets isn't one that shows up all that often in geological history.

It's actually an academic joke.

Of course I know it was a practical joke. I hadn't registered that it had been engineered by Georg Gamow, but I read the Mr. Tompkins books as child and find the idea perfectly credible.

I'm not a philosopher. How could I possibly know?

Most people who know anything about physics have that idea. The tendency is to write off the rest as nut-jobs.

When it was first invented serous physicists like Ernest Mach were dubious about the physical reality of discrete atoms, but Einstein's

It seems that "semiotics" is what you're talking about, or symbology, vis-a-vis linguistics, which is about language, about those both being aspects of, "inter-subjective accounts".

Truth is discovered / lies are invented / when a lie's discovered / that's a truth.

There's something to be said about Oxford vs. Cambridge, here for example there is _always_ the standard, serial, Oxford, Harvard comma, and its omission is considered poor style and making the language less correctly expressive. It's wrong.

We can't just say that Russell was ignorant about the Russell-ian retro-thesis, though it takes a generous reading of something like "Principia Mathematica" to arrive at that he was aware that some of his stipulations were un-founded, which is problematic since they claim well-foundedness. This is the discussion of "isolation" and "significance" in Russell, those basically being accounts of "restriction of comprehension" instead of "expansion of comprehension". So, then there's Quine, who sort of lies less than Russell (via omission) yet as well always sort of backpedals into what he "wants" to say.

That track infected and is endemic in "modern logic", while though, it is definitely not accepted the "quasi-modal" aspects of "material implication" since instead a modal, temporal, relevance logic is considered the correct "modern logic".

There are definite schools of realist and platonist and idealistic logic in the 20'th century, often embedded directly in the fundamental works of later the existentialism and nihilism for what are Being and Nothing, like for Derrida about Hussserl about geometry and a realist, platonist, idealistic account of it.

About semantics, language and semantics, here there's considered that Herbrand semantics makes the account that anything that can be written in natural language can be written unambiguously in symbolic language, and vice versa. The Montague semantics are ignored and considered haphazard. Similarly, De Morgan and direct implication provides anything necessary for inference including eschewing "material implication".

The "edge" and "corner" cases make a great account of the rational and modular, here for example about tiling the field or tesselation as you put it nicely or as with regards to picture-elements pixels or volume-elements voxels, basically then for "cases", as for "modes".