If you knew what you were talking about, which means you'd have to do some reading instead of making an ass of yourself, you wouldn't have to be betting. It's been widely reported that both the disagree light and displaying AOA are options that Boeing charges for.
On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 12:27:03 PM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@columbus.rr.com wrot e:
are" then the AD was a brilliantly crafted document that just proves how aw ful 3rd world pilots are. If you view the AD as a critical step in the PRO CESS of ensuring that a known problem does not cause a problem then it is a screaming failure. The AD process did not prevent the second plane from c rashing. It is bullshit.
e light that were going to be the most susceptible to the problem. They ig nored that. Boeing should have grounded those planes or sent representative s to sit in the middle seat on flights with that configuration until a prop er fix was put in. As I have stated before, the first crash was unacceptab le. The second crash is into twilight zone crazy. The CEO of Boeing should have been forced to resign as soon as they say the jackscrew set all the w ay down on the Ethiopian crash. The technical director of the 737-MAX shoul d have been fired as soon as they saw the jackscrew. The lawyer who wrote the AD and all the technical people who signed off on it (and in the FAA to o) should resign.
If it was so obvious that the second crash should have been expected and ob vious that the MCAS was a badly designed piece of equipment, why did the ai rlines and for that matter, the PILOTS, continue to fly the planes? Are yo u saying the airlines and the pilots had no idea there was a problem?
-- Rick C. -+-+ Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging -+-+ Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209
And a horrible overstatement of the risk if the crew is properly trained an d don't panic. This is the single point that is abundantly clear. The pre vious flight had a pilot on board who recognized the problem and told the c rew how to deal with it. So clearly the issue with the MCAS is not fatal. In the two crashes everyone is rushing to judgement without all the facts. Why not wait for the accident report to be completed.
Oh, right, this is a bunch of hens gossiping over the back fence.
-- Rick C. -++- Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging -++- Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209
te:
te:
te:
g the
the
may
ny
rly.
re.
engineer coding a loop badly. That is a systematic failure of the whole en gineering process of Boeing.
es
out
ying. Do you mean the pilots for the airlines who bought planes without the indicators get overruled by someone?
at
OA
ea
ions
ttle
rlines
h tOf course there was cost. It would cost them lost profits to make standard an option that was not required to fly the plane safely.
BTW, your meaning was very much not clear and you did nothing to clarify it . "Discussion" is nothing like "overruled". If you reread your paragraph, you often use "it" without any clear indication of just what "it" means, l iterally. You still failed to explain what you mean really. "it's entirel y possible that there was discussion" means it is entirely possible there w asn't such a discussion.
Monday morning quarterbacks.
-- Rick C. -+++ Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging -+++ Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209
n at
AOA
idea
itions
little
irlines
ich
hat
Of course there was cost, very real cost. Obviously you know little of the software development process. It's like saying you have lost nothing if s omeone makes a copy of your book and shares it with a friend. It cost you nothing, right? Oh, but that ignores the many hours you spent writing does n't it?
-- Rick C. +--- Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging +--- Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209
On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 1:24:49 PM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrote :
ote:
eware" then the AD was a brilliantly crafted document that just proves how awful 3rd world pilots are. If you view the AD as a critical step in the P ROCESS of ensuring that a known problem does not cause a problem then it is a screaming failure. The AD process did not prevent the second plane from crashing. It is bullshit.
are light that were going to be the most susceptible to the problem. They ignored that. Boeing should have grounded those planes or sent representati ves to sit in the middle seat on flights with that configuration until a pr oper fix was put in. As I have stated before, the first crash was unaccept able. The second crash is into twilight zone crazy. The CEO of Boeing shou ld have been forced to resign as soon as they say the jackscrew set all the way down on the Ethiopian crash. The technical director of the 737-MAX sho uld have been fired as soon as they saw the jackscrew. The lawyer who wrot e the AD and all the technical people who signed off on it (and in the FAA too) should resign.
obvious that the MCAS was a badly designed piece of equipment, why did the airlines and for that matter, the PILOTS, continue to fly the planes? Are you saying the airlines and the pilots had no idea there was a problem?
You are a troll.
On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:10:47 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrot e:
e:
:trying
the
east
That
han
hat for
normal
se up.
don't
ntrol
e.
zing the MCAS design even when the actual failure was in the AoA sensor.
as
ns.
how
tot tubes that get clogged or any of many other failures that have downed p lanes? Mechanical failures happen and it is up to the pilots to know how t o handle them.
I take that to mean that you can't show us a similar design on another airc raft. Sure, pilots are *supposed* to be able to handle emergencies. That doesn't excuse aircraft designers from coming up with really bad designs that creat e more emergencies.
or something else that would pretty much be unstoppably fatal. The AoA se nsor failed BEFORE take off, the MCAS responded in a dangerous way and the pilots failed to handle the situation appropriately.
mely
o,
to mountains?
Really, really bad attempt at an example. These planes have redundant altimeters as well as other systems, eg GPS that give altitude.
the chances of this happening again.
obvious reasons. In fact, they filed paperwork with Boeing and the FAA ab out this issue four days before the second accident. Interesting...
n-air-crash/
son to suspect the airplane was not flyable.
adly when that happens... consistently. I think I'm missing your point.
y should a lack of training be tolerated and more than the operation of the plane???
eou think this is NOT a training problem? Obviously there is a common human factor that wasn't due to a single crew.
We'd first have to know what training they had or didn't have. Identifying runaway trim is supposed to be part of every pilot's most basic training. It's one of the procedures that's supposed to be committed to memory. For that matter, for the 737, if all else is screwed up, another basic that is supposed to be committed to memory is that in a clean configuration , set 75% power and 4 deg nose up pitch and the plane will fly. Yet these crews watched pitch go back and forth and never reached over to the two clearly marked switches to turn off the electric trim and set in manually, So, IDK. Maybe stupid is unfixable by training?
100purpose.
ntice
happen? How do you get everyone experienced to the same level if they neve r fly the plane?
It's not, it's called modern crew resource management, which was put into place following other crashes. The co-pilot is not supposed to be an apprentice, a subordinate who can't challenge the captain. They are supposed to be well qualified and encouraged to speak up, to question the captain. That isn't a pilot with 200 hours, you need at least 1500 in the USA and I think you'd have a hard time finding a 1500 hour pilot on a 737 or larger passenger aircraft here.
to the airport. Had these pilots been on top of their game there is no rea son to suspect they could have not also done the same thing. We will know more once the accident report is made public.
of
it should be able to fly the plane or he shouldn't be there.
deg
't
eno sense.
I'm saying that pilots have flown many times on normal flights. On those flights, was the trim going back and forth, being pushed nose down? No. Where was it? At about 4 deg nose up pitch. So now you're on a flight where suddenly the trim is going full down pitch, you have to use your trim buttons to bring it back. It keeps repeating. Hello? What seems to be the problem? Trim is running amok and you need to get it back to ~ 4 degre es. The trim wheels are right beside you, as are the switches to turn off the electric trim. You don't need to know anything about MCAS to figure out a plane can't fly with nose down trim.
st the
or).
ue
or is
from
rashing
to me.
not capable of "crashing the airplane" unless the pilot is not aware of wh at is happening. The pilots can compensate for the MCAS or turn it off.
e-lion-air-crash/
es (in
has a
he FAA:
re of
in
ess into
ockpit
ded the
ce and
again.
h an automated control. There are two of these sensors, but there seems to be no sanity checking.
g for use of the MCAS and we have seen in the reporting that there are inst ructions on what to do to deal with the MCAS not working right. So clearly they did plan for this eventuality.
oA sensor.
as
present.
rashed because of a faulty air speed indication from a clogged pitot tube ( faulty ground maintenance was suspected) showed the pilot wrong numbers and he asked the co-pilot to call out from his air speed indicator. Once off the ground the pilot's indicator increased the reading and he started to tr ust it rather than read the other TWO indicators where he could have picked two our of three that agreed.
he window. If you see ground in front of you, your angle of attack mostly likely is not too positive.
s to turn off the MCAS???
ety
ircraft.
How about a rational discussion?
ly
hat we don't have the accident report yet. But my comment was not about hi s argument, but his language. "dangerous automatic safety system" is just fear mongering.
here
hes
gh
e on the plane and the ones on the bridge they hit.
No it would not. MCAS is disabled with flaps deployed.
isable switch *is* an acceptable way to mitigate the possibility of the MCA S malfunctioning. Ask the aviation industry. I'm pretty sure they have fa irly similar rules across the globe or international air travel would be ve ry, very difficult.
e her a
es in
at as an
ult
ugh.
regardless of the ultimate cause of the crashes. I'm not so certain that t urning the system off is appropriate. In reality they should have three se nsors so the system has an idea of what is right.
ing fire. They shut them down. They have many circuit breakers through ou t the cabin to turn off malfunctioning equipment. This is standard procedu re.
he nose down and the pilot corrects with a thumbwheel. The process repeats , multiple times before the plane goes into a dive. The pilot should immed iately know the MCAS needs to be turned off in addition to other potential causes. This is clearly explained in the article linked above.
ots
was
nly
at may have been with the stick? I did read that as the electric trim was activated the stick gave more and more resistance to pulling back.
That's right, with enough wrong trim, you can't put enough force on the con trols to move them. That's why LA crashed in the end, the co-pilot stopped corre cting the trim. Another flight basic that pilots should know is that for any given deg of trim, the control forces increase with speed. Had they slowed down, they would have been better able to work the controls. Instead they just fought with the controls.
A reading was bogus???
llars
ement
ressure.
e)
nd
e. It is trimming the elevator. The pilot can override it
Well, not exactly, as evidenced by the crashes. The pilot can't override it with force on the controls, only by correcting the trim and then MCAS starts in again after about 10 seconds.
and if the MCAS continues to do the same thing repeatedly, it can be turned off. This is not like a full self driving car or an automated assembly li ne. The pilot is supposed to be aware and in control at all times.
Yes, but again we've just had at least 3 crews who were not able to deal with runaway trim. One crew that didn't crash, we don't know for sure, just that the jump seat guy told them what to do. They might have figured it out themselves or they could have crashed.
Also, in another example of what isn't right, that LA flight then contiued on to it's destination! They had to use mechanical trim, which is an emerg ency procedure and not pretty. As the plane changes speed or configuration, eg landing, one pilot has to be constanly fiddling with the trim wheels to keep it OK. In the US that flight would have made an immediate emergency landing.
lhat
uclear power plants get a lot of training as well and yet they make mistake s. What is your point?
in the design of the MCAS.
ROFL with that one. No words. FAA and similar the world over have the planes grounded with 300 dead and you think they are just reacting to PR?
But they will certainly make sure every pilot is completely aware and fami liar with the operation and issues.
They did that after LA, how did that work out?
le this event and the pilots failed to pick up on the notices that were sen t out. I would have no concerns flying on the 737 MAX just the way it is i f the pilots are correctly trained.
ly
s dagain.
that. Elsewhere you acknowledge that at no point was the plane unflyable. If so, what was the cause of the crash?
When it's written up, as is often the case, there will be plenty of blame to go around:
Boeing - Incredibly bad design relying on just one sensor and not telling FAA that they had increased the amount of trim MCAS can apply to 3X what FAA was told it was limited to
FAA - Approving a really bad design and maybe being too friendly with Boein g, relying on Boeing too much
Pilots - Failure to recognize runaway trim and follow the simple procedure they are supposed to know
Airlines - Ehtiopia having a co-pilot with just 200 hours. LA, probably fo r maintenance incompetence, not fixing this after the other flight or flights . Should also be some procedure where pilots who experience a serious problem log it and the next crew is made aware of it. Also maybe training issues, we don't know yet.
ote:
ote:
te:
by trying
f the
least
That
than
that for
to normal
nose up.
I don't
control
que.
cizing the MCAS design even when the actual failure was in the AoA sensor.
was
eions.
show
pitot tubes that get clogged or any of many other failures that have downed planes? Mechanical failures happen and it is up to the pilots to know how to handle them.
rcraft.
't
ate
es or something else that would pretty much be unstoppably fatal. The AoA sensor failed BEFORE take off, the MCAS responded in a dangerous way and th e pilots failed to handle the situation appropriately.
remely
too,
into mountains?
e the chances of this happening again.
or obvious reasons. In fact, they filed paperwork with Boeing and the FAA about this issue four days before the second accident. Interesting...
ion-air-crash/
eason to suspect the airplane was not flyable.
badly when that happens... consistently. I think I'm missing your point.
Why should a lack of training be tolerated and more than the operation of t he plane???
one
.you think this is NOT a training problem? Obviously there is a common hum an factor that wasn't due to a single crew.
ng
on,
,h 100
s purpose.
rentice
go
t happen? How do you get everyone experienced to the same level if they ne ver fly the plane?
k to the airport. Had these pilots been on top of their game there is no r eason to suspect they could have not also done the same thing. We will kno w more once the accident report is made public.
h of
kpit should be able to fly the plane or he shouldn't be there.
4 degse
on't
the
e no sense.
im
rees.
inst the
nsor).
true
se or is
S from
crashing
ry to me.
is not capable of "crashing the airplane" unless the pilot is not aware of what is happening. The pilots can compensate for the MCAS or turn it off.
the-lion-air-crash/
imes (in
er has a
the FAA:
Tlure of
on in
tness into
cockpit
unded the
once and
p again.
ith an automated control. There are two of these sensors, but there seems to be no sanity checking.
ing for use of the MCAS and we have seen in the reporting that there are in structions on what to do to deal with the MCAS not working right. So clear ly they did plan for this eventuality.
AoA sensor.
was
e present.
crashed because of a faulty air speed indication from a clogged pitot tube (faulty ground maintenance was suspected) showed the pilot wrong numbers a nd he asked the co-pilot to call out from his air speed indicator. Once of f the ground the pilot's indicator increased the reading and he started to trust it rather than read the other TWO indicators where he could have pick ed two our of three that agreed.
the window. If you see ground in front of you, your angle of attack mostl y likely is not too positive.
res to turn off the MCAS???
afety
aircraft.
How about a rational discussion?
ally
that we don't have the accident report yet. But my comment was not about his argument, but his language. "dangerous automatic safety system" is jus t fear mongering.
there
ashes
high
ple on the plane and the ones on the bridge they hit.
disable switch *is* an acceptable way to mitigate the possibility of the M CAS malfunctioning. Ask the aviation industry. I'm pretty sure they have fairly similar rules across the globe or international air travel would be very, very difficult.
one her a
nces in
that as an
fault
nough.
nas
d regardless of the ultimate cause of the crashes. I'm not so certain that turning the system off is appropriate. In reality they should have three sensors so the system has an idea of what is right.
ching fire. They shut them down. They have many circuit breakers through out the cabin to turn off malfunctioning equipment. This is standard proce dure.
ct
the nose down and the pilot corrects with a thumbwheel. The process repea ts, multiple times before the plane goes into a dive. The pilot should imm ediately know the MCAS needs to be turned off in addition to other potentia l causes. This is clearly explained in the article linked above.
ilots
t was
only
that may have been with the stick? I did read that as the electric trim wa s activated the stick gave more and more resistance to pulling back.
ontrols
recting
ed
yAoA reading was bogus???
dollars
agement
pressure.
ure)
and
ut
ane. It is trimming the elevator. The pilot can override it
ed off. This is not like a full self driving car or an automated assembly line. The pilot is supposed to be aware and in control at all times.
drgency
rol
that
nuclear power plants get a lot of training as well and yet they make mista kes. What is your point?
't in the design of the MCAS.
.miliar with the operation and issues.
ndle this event and the pilots failed to pick up on the notices that were s ent out. I would have no concerns flying on the 737 MAX just the way it is if the pilots are correctly trained.
LA
ckly
his
ved
d again.
s that. Elsewhere you acknowledge that at no point was the plane unflyable . If so, what was the cause of the crash?
ing,
eThese are the things that are all about the first crash. How the second cr ash took place is where the really scary stuff needs to be explored. Your p oints above do not even begin to go into how the plane was given the green light to fly after all the awfulness that you mention above.
for
ts.
em
,Boeing marketed this plane in such a way that the pilot with 200 hours was good to go. If Boeing knew that 200 hours was not enough then they would h ave, at a minimum, recommended a minimum amount of simulator time for pilot s. Boeing wooed everyone into believing that these pilots were acceptable f or this aircraft. You cannot have it both ways...namely that Boeing pushes the MAX as an easy plane to fly (an exact flying experience to the 737) an d then crap all over the pilots when the plane crashes because the pilots a re no damn good.
Do we really care was the failing component the mechanical vane. the potentiometer/resolver, the cabling or the MCAS input card, the end result is the same: This is just one input channel. With garbage into the control, the system will produce garbage out,
It is quite possible that the failure location may have been in different places in the two crashes, but still in the same input channel.
Fixing one bug of any of the components listed above, unless the single channel input channel architecture is fixed.
On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 9:44:25 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrote :
:ying
t t
for
rmal
up.
't
ol
g the MCAS design even when the actual failure was in the AoA sensor.
esign
e the
vator
cable
ings when presented with bad data. That does not mean the plane will crash as can be seen from the Lion Air flight prior to the fatal flight.
OK, change the elevator example to one where there is an elevator operator. Instead of having an emergency braking system, the elevator relies on the operator remembering and carrying out the emergency procedure on a single failure point design. Bad system, bad idea. We've had plenty of crashes that have shown crews can't follow procedures, especially in a crisis situation. And having the plane point the nose to the ground at just a few thousand feet on takeoff, is indeed a crisis.
to suspect the airplane was not flyable. Other pilots have experienced th is issue and flown the plane back to the airport. Had these pilots been on top of their game there is no reason to suspect they could have not also d one the same thing. We will know more once the accident report is made pub lic.
rim
dure,
ff
Air
plane
ination.
irlines
the
.is
mhing
me.
t capable of "crashing the airplane" unless the pilot is not aware of what is happening. The pilots can compensate for the MCAS or turn it off.
ould
ained in using it. It appears that Boeing may have not presented the info properly.
The pilots did not have to know ANYTHING about MCAS. What they were experiencing was runaway trim, which can happen on any aircraft with electric trim, exactly what was causing it was not important. That is why it's part of, or is at least supposed to be part of all very basic pilot training. What did they think those two clearly marked trim disable switches were for? Blowing the horn? And MCAS is a horrific, bad design too. It's very possible there will be criminal charges before this is over.
ion-air-crash/
(in
s a
FAA:
of
into
pit
the
and
in.
n automated control. There are two of these sensors, but there seems to be no sanity checking. I expect a failure in the AoA sensor was considered i n the planning for use of the MCAS and we have seen in the reporting that t here are instructions on what to do to deal with the MCAS not working right .
Those instructions pertaining specifically to MCAS only came out after LA. And then we had the Ethiopian crash, with the airline claiming that it's pilots knew about the Boeing directive. Hell, they'd have to be on MArs to even need that with all the coverage the LA crash got.
They planned for it by relying on the pilots identifying runaway trim and following the basic, simple procedure. How did that work out?
n d
trim
le
pilot know how to deal with the situation. Perhaps it is because of what you wrote in elsewhere, the issue is runaway trim which was already an issu e the pilots should have known how to deal with.
Bingo. And again, it's not rocket science. All the flights where you didn't crash, trim was at ~4 deg. This flight it's getting driven to nose down, into the ground by *something*. Hello? Turn off the electric trim!
o turn off the MCAS???
raft.
about a rational discussion?
er a
in
as an
.
fire. They shut them down. They have many circuit breakers through out t he cabin to turn off malfunctioning equipment. This is standard procedure.
eYou need more crashes to realize that it's a very bad design, one that is worse than the problem it's trying to fix?
nt
sure.
The results speak for themselves.
In the USA it's a minimum of 1500 hours and like I said, at that point I think you'd have a hard time finding a 1500 hour co-pilot on a 737 or larger passenger airplane. They typically build up hours starting smaller, working up.
No question that keeping the Max as close to existing 737s was an essential design objective. But IDK about it being the reason for not putting the AOA on the display or having the disagree light as an option. The proof there would be whether different training was required for the airlines that choose it. There is also the issue of explaining it, as in what's the AOA really there for? Analysts were saying that Boeing makes a lot on these upgrades, it's kind of like buying a car.
Even pilots disagree on the importance of knowing about MCAS. When LA crashed, American Airlines pilot union was mad that they were not told about MCAS. The head of United's union said that they didn't care, that they don't need to know those kinds of details on the aircraft. I thought that was shocking, not a good thing. Another data point, AA ordered all it's Maxs with both options. Southwest got the disagree light from Boeing, and somehow they have the AOA displayed, sounded like it might be from some other add-on instrument packaged from another company, not sure. United ordered theirs with neither.
On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 1:24:49 PM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrote :
ote:
eware" then the AD was a brilliantly crafted document that just proves how awful 3rd world pilots are. If you view the AD as a critical step in the P ROCESS of ensuring that a known problem does not cause a problem then it is a screaming failure. The AD process did not prevent the second plane from crashing. It is bullshit.
are light that were going to be the most susceptible to the problem. They ignored that. Boeing should have grounded those planes or sent representati ves to sit in the middle seat on flights with that configuration until a pr oper fix was put in. As I have stated before, the first crash was unaccept able. The second crash is into twilight zone crazy. The CEO of Boeing shou ld have been forced to resign as soon as they say the jackscrew set all the way down on the Ethiopian crash. The technical director of the 737-MAX sho uld have been fired as soon as they saw the jackscrew. The lawyer who wrot e the AD and all the technical people who signed off on it (and in the FAA too) should resign.
obvious that the MCAS was a badly designed piece of equipment, why did the airlines and for that matter, the PILOTS, continue to fly the planes? Are you saying the airlines and the pilots had no idea there was a problem?
I guess like Boeing the airlines and authorities relied on pilots being a lot more competent than at least some of them really are. They figured with all the news and the AD, pilots would know what to do next time. The pilots, who knows what any of them were thinking.
On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 1:35:12 PM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrote :
e:
rote:
rote:
:rote:
ing the
n the
ss may
any
oorly.
ware.
e engineer coding a loop badly. That is a systematic failure of the whole engineering process of Boeing.
ines
nt out
by
ee
nding. Do you mean the pilots for the airlines who bought planes without t he indicators get overruled by someone?
n at
AOA
idea
itions
little
airlines
ich
hat
rd an option that was not required to fly the plane safely.
Lost profits is not "cost". Cost is what it really costs Boeing to put the two safety options in the airplane. It would have been peanuts, now it's going to cost them billions going forward. Smart move? And while it's not "required" to safely fly the plane, assuming the pilots can correctly identify what's wrong and carry out the correct procedure, we've seen how that worked out. I wouldn't fly on a Max until it's updated .
it. "Discussion" is nothing like "overruled". If you reread your paragrap h, you often use "it" without any clear indication of just what "it" means, literally. You still failed to explain what you mean really. "it's entir ely possible that there was discussion" means it is entirely possible there wasn't such a discussion.
You mean I failed to bring clarity, like you did with that word salad above ? You're right, that when one says that it's entirely possible that A happene d, that also means it's also possible that it didn't. We'll find out what went on at Boeing and the FAA and I suspect some of it won't be good. And I clearly explained what I meant about overruled:
"it's entirely possible that there was discussion at Boeing about putting the AOA indicator onto the display and putting the AOA disagree light in all planes as standard, necessary or at least a good idea for safety and that it was overridden, with a profit motive."
I disagree. That MCAS, relying on a single vane sensor, in a plane that actually had TWO as well as other data that could be used for stall identification, had a potential for disaster was easy to see. Do you know that the system didn't even check that AOA was normal while on the ground! LA took off with it showing a high AOA. Some mud, some tree sap, could gum up a vane that will immediately head the plane to the ground when the flaps retract. And relying on pilots to correctly identify what's wrong and fix it, in a crisis situation on takeoff, at low altitudes, doesn't excuse it.
Juan Browne doesn't agree with you. Watch his videos. He says when it happens, there's only about 45 seconds to get it right. There's the shaking stick and multiple alarms going off. The pilots become highly focused, but not necessarily on the right thing. At first the pilot has success with the disable button, but that only lasts 10 seconds, before MCAS runs the jackscrew again. They then waste precious time repeating the button press.
He says in his experience, a jumpseat pilot, who's back from the rest, and not running the plane, but seeing the big picture, has an easier time diagnosing the problem, despite distractions, and figuring out the right solution.
--
Thanks,
- Win
The only way to get hours of experience is to fly the airplane. If you can't get a copilots position on a commercial airliner, how is one suppose to get flight time experience? What is a pilot in training suppose to do? Sit in the cockpit and watch someone else fly? After the fundamentals, flying is "learn by doing".
Hours flying in a simulator or small plane allegedly count towards the necessary hours making setting a required minimum amount of flight time rather tricky. I would guess(tm) that 200 hrs is sufficient to demonstrate that the prospective copilot is not going to make a basic mistake. Apparently, it's not sufficient to insure that he can react properly to a more unusual or complicated failure.
"Capt. Sully Sullenberger statements..."
Qatar Airways pilot Greg Kelly offered on Facebook: (...) The fact remains that most parts of the world hire 200-hour cadets and have exceptional safety records because the quality of training is good and geared toward professional standards.
Hans Baldwin, a captain at Vietnam Airlines also contradicted Sullenberger: There are people with barely more than 200 hours, flying nuclear armed military aircraft, over your country every single day. If the training is good then it's a total non issue.
Also:
-- Jeff Liebermann jeffl@cruzio.com 150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558
I was talking to a recently retired (age) Delta pilot at the gym the other day. he was saying that newly hired right-seaters for the US major airlines are either male, 48YO, with 15,000hrs or female, 28YO, with 1,500 hrs.
snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
Inertial Reference Unit.
It is about a $70k General Electric unit. Very high precision.
It keeps mobile sat dishes pointed on ground units and air units.
I am pretty sure that a slightly smaller unit gets incorporated into an "AOA sensor".
snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
There is not a cockpit in the air that does not have an AOA indicator.
The "option" is for an indicator light that shows when the units are not in agreement. Not what their reading is.
Another name is "attitude". And I gaurantee there is a read out in the cockpit.
Winfield Hill wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@drn.newsguy.com:
Maybe you should view it again. "the option" is an error (disagreement) indicator light. Even if that "light" is a flashing icon on an LED panel, it is a mere error light.
The ACTUAL ANGLE DISPLAY IS not an option, and is included. It is ALWAYS included. It is part of the horizon indicator. Also always included.
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