737 Max

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:43677ace-12c5-4a9b-85de- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

You are an idiot, period.

MCAS has worked for decades.

This failure will come down to a computer code segment that was incorrectly written. And maybe add an additional transducer for redundant reference. There may well already be two.

Do you even know what a control loop is?

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

I'd bet money that the indicator LIGHT was the option, but AOA is always indicated in the cockpit.

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ng the MCAS design even when the actual failure was in the AoA sensor.

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How about planes that explode after too many ascents and descents? Or pito t tubes that get clogged or any of many other failures that have downed pla nes? Mechanical failures happen and it is up to the pilots to know how to handle them.

r something else that would pretty much be unstoppably fatal. The AoA sens or failed BEFORE take off, the MCAS responded in a dangerous way and the pi lots failed to handle the situation appropriately.

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You mean like reporting the wrong altitude so that pilots fly directly into mountains?

e chances of this happening again.

bvious reasons. In fact, they filed paperwork with Boeing and the FAA abou t this issue four days before the second accident. Interesting...

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n to suspect the airplane was not flyable.

ly when that happens... consistently. I think I'm missing your point.

should a lack of training be tolerated and more than the operation of the p lane???

If the pilots on at least three crews fail to recognize the problem, do you think this is NOT a training problem? Obviously there is a common human f actor that wasn't due to a single crew.

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There's a load of BS. "Equal to the captain"??? How exactly would that ha ppen? How do you get everyone experienced to the same level if they never fly the plane?

the airport. Had these pilots been on top of their game there is no reaso n to suspect they could have not also done the same thing. We will know mo re once the accident report is made public.

should be able to fly the plane or he shouldn't be there.

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Not sure what you are trying to say here. In context your comments make no sense.

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ot capable of "crashing the airplane" unless the pilot is not aware of what is happening. The pilots can compensate for the MCAS or turn it off.

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an automated control. There are two of these sensors, but there seems to b e no sanity checking.

for use of the MCAS and we have seen in the reporting that there are instru ctions on what to do to deal with the MCAS not working right. So clearly t hey did plan for this eventuality.

sensor.

Yes, I didn't realize the AoA is a sensor and the indicator might not be pr esent.

shed because of a faulty air speed indication from a clogged pitot tube (fa ulty ground maintenance was suspected) showed the pilot wrong numbers and h e asked the co-pilot to call out from his air speed indicator. Once off th e ground the pilot's indicator increased the reading and he started to trus t it rather than read the other TWO indicators where he could have picked t wo our of three that agreed.

window. If you see ground in front of you, your angle of attack mostly li kely is not too positive.

to turn off the MCAS???

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w about a rational discussion?

t we don't have the accident report yet. But my comment was not about his argument, but his language. "dangerous automatic safety system" is just fe ar mongering.

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You mean like Florida Air 90??? MCAS may well have saved all those people on the plane and the ones on the bridge they hit.

able switch *is* an acceptable way to mitigate the possibility of the MCAS malfunctioning. Ask the aviation industry. I'm pretty sure they have fair ly similar rules across the globe or international air travel would be very , very difficult.

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gardless of the ultimate cause of the crashes. I'm not so certain that tur ning the system off is appropriate. In reality they should have three sens ors so the system has an idea of what is right.

g fire. They shut them down. They have many circuit breakers through out the cabin to turn off malfunctioning equipment. This is standard procedure .

nose down and the pilot corrects with a thumbwheel. The process repeats, multiple times before the plane goes into a dive. The pilot should immedia tely know the MCAS needs to be turned off in addition to other potential ca uses. This is clearly explained in the article linked above.

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From what I read there was some limit to what the pilot could do. But that may have been with the stick? I did read that as the electric trim was ac tivated the stick gave more and more resistance to pulling back.

reading was bogus???

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It is trimming the elevator. The pilot can override it and if the MCAS c ontinues to do the same thing repeatedly, it can be turned off. This is no t like a full self driving car or an automated assembly line. The pilot is supposed to be aware and in control at all times.

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lear power plants get a lot of training as well and yet they make mistakes. What is your point?

n the design of the MCAS.

They are improving it mostly as a PR issue. But they will certainly make s ure every pilot is completely aware and familiar with the operation and iss ues.

this event and the pilots failed to pick up on the notices that were sent out. I would have no concerns flying on the 737 MAX just the way it is if the pilots are correctly trained.

ain.

So why did they not know how to handle the situation? You don't address th at. Elsewhere you acknowledge that at no point was the plane unflyable. I f so, what was the cause of the crash?

--

  Rick C. 

  -- Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging 
  -- Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209

So what is them magic number?

--

  Rick C. 

  -+ Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging 
  -+ Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209

"Indefeasible right of use (IRU) is a permanent contractual agreement, that cannot be undone, between the owners of a communications system and a customer of that system."

--

  Rick C. 

  +- Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging 
  +- Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209

I'll take that bet. Case of Stella Artois please.

--

  Rick C. 

  ++ Get a 1,000 miles of free Supercharging 
  ++ Tesla referral code - https://ts.la/richard11209

Yes, you won. Juan Browne showed where the 737 AoA option goes, squeezed into an LCD screen's upper right corner. It's rather expensive and missing by default. He intimated new pilots aren't trained in its use, and Boeing doesn't want it added, increasing their training burden, maybe even triggering required simulator time. Older pilots, with fighter-jet backgrounds, are already proficient in understanding and using AoA indicators.

--
 Thanks, 
    - Win

In this case, no. It was an option that Boeing charged more for. The excuse being that it would increase crew workload. All part of the ongoing drive to deskill everything and reduce the role of the crew to mere bus drivers. Reduce costs at the expense of safety.

How any such safety critical function should have a single point of failure is beyond contempt, not to mention the fact that the operation of mcas was not in the manual and not trained for. There's plenty of other systems that could cross correlated with the aot sensor, such as the adiru, but that isn't done either. A gross systems engineering failure and one wonders where their collective heads were at at the design stage.

Thread here, fyi:

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the guy who said the whole thing rests on a single engineer who wrote a cr appy control loop. I was basically saying that if a single engineer can wr ite a loop that brings down a plane then it is not on that guy but rather r eflects a systematic failure in the whole engineering process. I am sure t he loop was vetted

hese planes ( 2 of them for God's sake) crashed due to a far more insidious poison that has taken hold into Boeing's culture.

garding this MCAS design is clear it will be so obviously horrible that any 10 year old will see the folly in it.

rplane. NEVER NEVER NEVER. I know there are engineers at Boeing (not pers onally but I know corporate culture) that said out loud "We have a situatio n where an AOA failure can crash this plane" And you know what??? the AOA failure crashed the plane. That is what I am talking about . I am not an aeronautics engineer, but I know that an AOA failure should not crash a pla ne. I really boils down to this level of non sense. Why did Boeing design a plane where an AoA senser failure takes the plane down? It is unacceptab le. And then through some unbelievable convoluted burst of arrogance they encouraged people to keep flying this and a 2nd plane went down

eason why the planes HAD to crash even assuming this was what happened. Th e PILOTS could have flown the plane if they did what they were supposed to do. If you blamed the lack of education or specifically drawing the pilots attention to this issue before they entered the planes, then I might agree . But I don't see a problem with the MCAS that meant the plane had to cras h when the AoA failed to work.

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If you view the AD as a legal document and the fine print says "buyer bewar e" then the AD was a brilliantly crafted document that just proves how awfu l 3rd world pilots are. If you view the AD as a critical step in the PROCE SS of ensuring that a known problem does not cause a problem then it is a s creaming failure. The AD process did not prevent the second plane from cra shing. It is bullshit.

Boeing KNEW that there were a certain number of planes without the compare light that were going to be the most susceptible to the problem. They igno red that. Boeing should have grounded those planes or sent representatives to sit in the middle seat on flights with that configuration until a proper fix was put in. As I have stated before, the first crash was unacceptable . The second crash is into twilight zone crazy. The CEO of Boeing should h ave been forced to resign as soon as they say the jackscrew set all the way down on the Ethiopian crash. The technical director of the 737-MAX should have been fired as soon as they saw the jackscrew. The lawyer who wrote th e AD and all the technical people who signed off on it (and in the FAA too) should resign.

That's false. MCAS is only in the 737 Max which has only been in use for a couple years now.

It's hard to take issue with any of your strong points. Bad engineering, bad management, and horrible followup.

--
 Thanks, 
    - Win

On Tuesday, March 19, 2019 at 8:10:25 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrot e:

ote:

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neer coding a loop badly. That is a systematic failure of the whole engine ering process of Boeing.

I will if you can cite for us another example of an automated "safety" system, relying on one sensor, when two are present, that can strongly and continuously put the plane into a plunge headed for earth.

ability of the pilot to override the system is an acceptable system in an a irplane.

And how has that worked out?

the failure.

Make up your mind, you just claim that it's acceptable in the industry.

It was listed as Hazardous rather than Catastrophic which is clearly what has proven to be true... assuming the MCAS proves to be the problem.

least three of the 737 MAX flights apparently on take off. Is this not in spected prior to flight??? If they are that prone to failure, eventually a plane will take off with both not working and then they'll be royally scre wed no matter what the MCAS does.

I've said here that we don't even know if it's really the AOA sensor itself , wiring, connections, the instrumentation that reads the sensor, etc. Which again is quite remarkable. It sounds like the investigators may not know either. Otherwise you'd think there would have been an urgent directive put out months ago, to inspect or replace something. Yet, AFAIK, that has not happened.

No, I clearly mean that it's entirely possible that there was discussion at Boeing about putting the AOA indicator onto the display and putting the AOA disagree light in all planes as standard, necessary or at least a good idea for safety and that it was overridden, with a profit motive. Those additions essentially cost Boeing nothing to put the AOA on the display and very little for a disagree light. It would not surprise me if the intent was that airlines would want this for safety and pay many thousands of dollars for it, which would go right to the bottom line at Boeing. The FBI is investigating what exactly went on.

I know perfectly well what the term means and a transducer can either have an analog or digital output. So, smart guy, which is the AOA?

Of course they do.

That's total BS, have you not seen pictures of the actual vane on the plane? If it's not in the airstream, it's useless, it can't measure the angle of the air passing by. So much for who's informed. Good grief.

Yes, they charged a lot, for a no-cost software add-on. But I'll bet instead that the bottom-line decision was based on minimizing pilot training, selling many more planes by asserting no new training would be required.

--
 Thanks, 
    - Win

On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:10:47 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrot e:

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zing the MCAS design even when the actual failure was in the AoA sensor.

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tot tubes that get clogged or any of many other failures that have downed p lanes? Mechanical failures happen and it is up to the pilots to know how t o handle them.

or something else that would pretty much be unstoppably fatal. The AoA se nsor failed BEFORE take off, the MCAS responded in a dangerous way and the pilots failed to handle the situation appropriately.

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to mountains?

the chances of this happening again.

obvious reasons. In fact, they filed paperwork with Boeing and the FAA ab out this issue four days before the second accident. Interesting...

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son to suspect the airplane was not flyable.

adly when that happens... consistently. I think I'm missing your point.

y should a lack of training be tolerated and more than the operation of the plane???

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ou think this is NOT a training problem? Obviously there is a common human factor that wasn't due to a single crew.

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happen? How do you get everyone experienced to the same level if they neve r fly the plane?

Actually, not a load of BS. There was at least one crash that I can think of where, because of culture, the co-pilot did not speak up to correct a mi stake of the pilot. I think it was Korean Air, or maybe the PanAm flight p iloted by the Scandinavian pilot that was 'a legend'...in any case, the cu lture of being totally subordinate/don't question a captain was identified at *THE* reason why the plane crashed. The FAA made this point clearly and as a result, airlines around the world revised their training to account f or this fact.

Playing fast and loose with the facts from other incidents does not validat e your comments regarding this incident

-J

to the airport. Had these pilots been on top of their game there is no rea son to suspect they could have not also done the same thing. We will know more once the accident report is made public.

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not capable of "crashing the airplane" unless the pilot is not aware of wh at is happening. The pilots can compensate for the MCAS or turn it off.

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h an automated control. There are two of these sensors, but there seems to be no sanity checking.

g for use of the MCAS and we have seen in the reporting that there are inst ructions on what to do to deal with the MCAS not working right. So clearly they did plan for this eventuality.

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rashed because of a faulty air speed indication from a clogged pitot tube ( faulty ground maintenance was suspected) showed the pilot wrong numbers and he asked the co-pilot to call out from his air speed indicator. Once off the ground the pilot's indicator increased the reading and he started to tr ust it rather than read the other TWO indicators where he could have picked two our of three that agreed.

he window. If you see ground in front of you, your angle of attack mostly likely is not too positive.

s to turn off the MCAS???

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ircraft.

How about a rational discussion?

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hat we don't have the accident report yet. But my comment was not about hi s argument, but his language. "dangerous automatic safety system" is just fear mongering.

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isable switch *is* an acceptable way to mitigate the possibility of the MCA S malfunctioning. Ask the aviation industry. I'm pretty sure they have fa irly similar rules across the globe or international air travel would be ve ry, very difficult.

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regardless of the ultimate cause of the crashes. I'm not so certain that t urning the system off is appropriate. In reality they should have three se nsors so the system has an idea of what is right.

ing fire. They shut them down. They have many circuit breakers through ou t the cabin to turn off malfunctioning equipment. This is standard procedu re.

he nose down and the pilot corrects with a thumbwheel. The process repeats , multiple times before the plane goes into a dive. The pilot should immed iately know the MCAS needs to be turned off in addition to other potential causes. This is clearly explained in the article linked above.

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at may have been with the stick? I did read that as the electric trim was activated the stick gave more and more resistance to pulling back.

A reading was bogus???

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e. It is trimming the elevator. The pilot can override it and if the MCAS continues to do the same thing repeatedly, it can be turned off. This is not like a full self driving car or an automated assembly line. The pilot is supposed to be aware and in control at all times.

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uclear power plants get a lot of training as well and yet they make mistake s. What is your point?

in the design of the MCAS.

sure every pilot is completely aware and familiar with the operation and i ssues.

le this event and the pilots failed to pick up on the notices that were sen t out. I would have no concerns flying on the 737 MAX just the way it is i f the pilots are correctly trained.

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that. Elsewhere you acknowledge that at no point was the plane unflyable. If so, what was the cause of the crash?

MCAS was not described in any of the manuals for pilots, nor was it mentioned in the limited training for transitioning to the Max. The term appeared a in the glossary or index, but nothing beyond that.

I guess because they didn't want the pilots to be able to overrule it. There have been crashes where the pilots continued to pull back on the controls with the plane stalled and rode it into the ground. Something similar happened here with LA. The pilot kept countering MCAS using the trim buttons for ~ 10 mins. Then he handed control over to the co-pilot, I think because the captain wanted to read the manuals. The co-pilot only weakly countered the trim twice, then did nothing as it headed to the ground. And mind you, this is with the trim wheels right next to him, showing abnormal down trim, what it was at and having had the experience of the last 10 mins. If they had just kept countering the trim, the plane could have flown until it ran out of fuel. Another flight dynamics basic is that when you're fighting trim, the trim forces are more powerful the higher the speed. They could have slowed the plane, instead they flew relatively fast and the Ethiopian plane went even faster. Also, this trouble all started when the flaps were retracted. So, if you're confused, can't figure out what happened, might the idea of deploying flaps again not come to mind? Had they done that, it would have stopped.

That's a lie. Everyone that has followed this at all, knows it was added to the Max because the new engines, their placement in a slightly different location on the winds, made the 737 Max easier to stall at high speeds. It's been covered in this thread, at length. Why do you think there was all that discussion here about the engine placement?

It's rather odd if it's a software programming error that Boeing hasn't said that. Instead they are not disputing that MCAS worked as intended. Do you know how to read? Was it a software error that made the AOA disagree light an option that cost many thousands extra? Software error that made showing the AOA on the display an option that cost many thousands extra? This is really, really bad. It's like putting a new system into a car that can make it swerve off the road, that relies on just one sensor, then charging extra for a warning light that shows it's screwing up.

Yes, and that is why the MCAS is first and foremost a marketing gimmick. That was the whole underlying marketing strategy of this MAX aircraft. BUY a 737-MAX....NO ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED!