737 Max

That's a lie. Boeing specifically said that it's an OPTION that you have to pay extra for. United in the USA says it's 737 Max don't have it. American Airlines does, they paid for it. Previous

Wrong. BOTH are options. If you're going to engage in the discussion, why don't you educate yourself instead of making a total ass of yourself?

Wrong! Attitude is the position of the aircraft relative to absolute horizontal, vertical, ie fixed coordinates. It's not the angle of the airflow over the wings.

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

It should be a part of the pilot walk around check of the craft.

Even if he has to move it with a selfie stick.

I can only imagine the only failure of one would be it sticking from being iced over somehow.

I cannot imagine it to be any hardware issue further upstream from that actual vane actuator. IOW, no wiring or signal problem. If they are failing it is due to it being mechanically frozen in motion. Gummy bearings? Naah... Ice... in Africa? Right after takeoff?

Since the actual transducer is not that far from the cockpit, perhaps there should be a jog device to knock it free if it is stuck. A little solenoid activated kicker. Or a way to check it for freedom of movement on the runway before takeoff.

You really are way out of your depth here. The artificial horizon displays the attitude of the airplane with respect to the GROUND. An AOA measures the angle of the air moving over the wing. They are very different things. If they were the same, there would be no need for an AOA period. And both the AOA display and the disagree light were options that cost extra.

That article is old news and says nothing about the root cause of the failure, eg if it was a manufacturing defect in the AOA sensor, a bad connection, tape over the AOA vane, etc. It merely says that Boeing is updating the software so that if a similar failure occurs again, it's less likely to result in a disaster.

ROFL, what a troll. You are the only one with the comprehension problem here.

And now this from the moron that told us a few posts ago that the AOA was determined inside the plane by inertial reference, that it's not a vane, etc. I told you clearly and correctly it's a vane sensor an we don't know if it's analog or digital. Got it now?

BS. Show us where Boeing said that a software programming error caused the crash. All they've said is they are updating the software so that it will use both AOA, will factor in other data, will not push down as much or continuously, etc. NONE of that has anything to do with a "software programming error" Such an error would be in the software did not meet the specs that were given, that it had some bug that caused it to do something that it wasn't supposed to do, eg freeze up. From everything we've seen, the software did exactly what it was supposed to do. MCAS was a bad SYSTEM design, not bad software. Software engineers write code, they don't design the AOA, MCAS, etc.

But he's a basket case.

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

Don't s*it yourself, boy.

I know what wing mechanics are. I do not need a primer from a silly and irrelevant nonsensical dork like you.

It actually senses more than one element of the current flight situation. The vane at the nose of the plane responds to only one. It detects the angle the entire plane is moving through the airmass.

Get off your hobby horse, child.

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:1390d5bc-a10c-4085-af6f- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

Previous

So what you are saying then is essentially with such big craft it is not needed as the procedures followed never put the plane in that situation.

So they stopped including it. So it has not been a problem all these years. Until the Max 8. But that failure was the fix they incorporated, not the fact that AOA indicators are not included in modern passenger jet cockpits. Turn off the fix, and the pilots all generally know how to trim a plane.

So the problem is the fix.

The fix for that is a taming of its operation and better pilot training to turn it off.

They are also stating making changes to the software decision engine.

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:87420fbb-bd97-428f-932e- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

You are incorrect. I know plenty.

Modern displays have it in a small vertical rectangle just to the right of the horizon bubble. I didn't say that it was the horizon bubble.

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:4d272ca8-f8fb-40a4-8685- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

Not accetable.

That should be required to say NEVER able to result in a catastrophic alteration of the flight characteristics.

less likely to sucks!

never able to rules!

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ng a disable switch *is* an acceptable way to mitigate the possibility of t he MCAS malfunctioning. Ask the aviation industry. I'm pretty sure they h ave fairly similar rules across the globe or international air travel would be very, very difficult.

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d crash took place is where the really scary stuff needs to be explored. Yo ur points above do not even begin to go into how the plane was given the gr een light to fly after all the awfulness that you mention above.

ame

What I wonder is that Boeing already knew of the weakness of this design an d had already done their own internal analysis and when the first accident happened, instead of evaluating it from ground zero, they evaluated through a prejudiced lens that they had developed over several months (or years). In other words, they were ripe for jumping to conclusions about the failur e mechanism. And they did rush into an AD and boom, a second plane crashed . It may very well turn out that this failure is more subtle than simply t urning off the trim or there is something that they did not fully understan d when they rushed into the AD.

That lead to the first crash. Then Boeing, FAA

Correct, you need a good design. Boeing knew they had a crappy design **be fore ** the first crash and then they rely on having perfect pilots to miti gate the next air crash. Boeing knows the general rules and capabilities o f the pilots who fly their planes. The second crash is on Boeing because i t is fundamentally rooted in a s***ty design.

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was good to go. If Boeing knew that 200 hours was not enough then they wou ld have, at a minimum, recommended a minimum amount of simulator time for p ilots. Boeing wooed everyone into believing that these pilots were acceptab le for this aircraft. You cannot have it both ways...namely that Boeing pu shes the MAX as an easy plane to fly (an exact flying experience to the 737 ) and then crap all over the pilots when the plane crashes because the pilo ts are no damn good.

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

They said that there was a software change involved in the fix.

Software is what provided the decision engine rules under which the hardware adjustment routines were carried out.

So the error is a system error based on the worst case outcome, ie pilot panic, and failure to disable an obviously malfunctioning correction system failure, which had erroneous data to form decisions with.

I am sorry, but even in a situation of pilot panic, and leaving such a system on, it should not EVER disregard all of its other sensors and commit obviously hogwild maneuver attempts. It should shut itself off.

That is software.

You seem to merely want the entire system removed. It was just the rate it was doing it at, and the refusal to accept pilot initiated trim changes. Again... that is some really bad software programming. They have reduced the rate, and modified the rules the computer goes by before disabling it due to an uncertainty.

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:8b27ded5-fa44-4876-b242- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

You're an idiot. It is a major error. The error was in the basic decision engine paradigms chosen. Since you claim to be literate, notice where they changed those very rules.

Right. The MCAS was the rationale used to allow 737 pilots to fly the MAX without meaningful additional training. They did not know how to fly the "raw" aircraft.

They already have that alarm, which, since you're pontificating on all this, you should know. It's called the stall warning alarm and in these kinds of planes it includes a stick shaker. The issue here was that the 737 Max was easier to get into a high speed stall. It's not clear if they could have gotten it certified without MCAS and even if they could, marketing a plane where you have to tell the pilots that it's easier to stall than the existing models may sound like a good idea to you, but then you don't have to sell the planes. But it's probably true that if they had just put the planes out there without MCAS we would not have had crashes due to the lack of MCAS. These planes rarely get into that kind of flight situation, something really bad has to be happening to begin with. The hazard introduced by MCAS was likely far greater than the stall hazard it was trying to prevent.

Of course you can't because you're not very bright.

Yes, indeed. How very brilliant and logical. Maybe the pilot could stick his head out the window and poke at it with a stick....

No, I never said that.

No, MCAS was never in any plane other than the 737 Max.

So it has not been a problem all

Because no plane until the Max had MCAS. Geez, why do we have to keep revisiting the basics with each stupid post you make?

Those display the plane's ATTITUDE, ie the plane's pitch with regard to vertical and horizontal. That is NOT angle of attack of the airstream over the wings. Which again is why Boeing put the AOA sensor in the Max so that it could be used by MCAS to prevent stalls. They made displaying it as an option, because it's not needed to fly the plane and not on other models of the 737. Got it now?