Re: OT: The Truth About Predator Drones

That's assuming that your side ever even saw it before it blew something up. I am surprised that terrorists haven't used drones - so simple. Even model aircraft could od a little damage and they have spread spectrum comms now.

Hardy

Reply to
HardySpicer
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No, it means they (the idiots that claim to have hacked it) found an open stream that was NOT ever encrypted. All they succeeded in doing was finding a carrier. No technical prowess required whatsoever.

No. It is more likely not encrypted at all.

Absolutely not. The GPS timestamps are going to keep that from ever happening. Just because the video is able to be seen, that doesn't mean that there was not more data included with each frame. In fact, I am sure that there is.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

No, it would be absolutely NOT possible.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

Considering all the other crap you have spewed, I doubt seriously that you know a goddamned thing about what the NSA wants or does, much less how they operate.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

Are you sure?

General instrument was able to digitize, compress, and send no less than 12 standard 6MHz wide analog video signals up to a bird that was only for analog TV signals, and they effectively increased satellite channel capacity ten fold.

I do not think that you have thought this through very well.

Digital signals can be passed over analog carriers, and are, every day, no problem.

It is all analog at some point.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

Bullshit.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

Total bullshit. It was designed for backhaul work. It was also used by companies like General Motors, to feed training seminars, etc. to all their dealerships. They were one of the first OTA educational systems of that depth.

ALL the major networks ended up using it, and that is what made GI the de facto standard, and is why they were UNsuccessfully sued as a monopoly. Uplink encoding is used by any content provider, and they must use GI gear because that is what all the birds use. So they ARE a monopoly, by default, but it is not their fault all the networks went with their gear.

VC-I was in use in 1983 and from then on.

It was retired on the last day of last year, 2008.

VC-II (1985)"was done for" satellite receivers, uplink encoders and decoders, and backhaul work, not just for HBO. It was retired in 1993 as piracy had to be nipped out of the system. That was VC-II RS and that is where the false keys and rolling keys and such came from. Then came DigiCipher and DigiCipher II.

It appears that you understand basic math.

VC-II was hardware items for cable system operators, sure, but it was ALSO hardware items for use in end user satellite set-top boxes, which have nothing to do with cable.

Reply to
HiggsField

You're an idiot.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

That was not encryption.

That was called "In-band gated sync scrambling".

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

You absolutely have no clue what was done or how or why. GI encrypted the entire 6MHz wide video signal, you dope. Maybe you are thinking of "OnTV". That was in-band gated synch scrambling and the audio was not digitized OR encrypted... it was simply shifted and not processed by the tuner unless the gate is shifted back where it belongs.

Here... ALL of these were around and failed as well.

Older television encryption systems

  • Oak Industries

Oak Orion was originally used for analog satellite television pay channel access in Canada. Was innovative for its time as it used digital audio. It has been completely replaced by digital encryption technologies. Was used by Sky Channel in Europe between the years 1982 and 1987. Oak developed related encryption systems for cable TV and broadcast pay TV services such as ON TV. The Oak systems used a sine wave added to the video signal to interfere with the video sync and relocated audio to a sub-carrier.

  • Leitch Technology

Leitch Viewguard is an analog encryption standard used primarily by broadcast TV networks in the North America. Its method of scrambling is by re-ordering the lines of video (Line Shuffle), but leaves the audio intact and listenable. Terrestrial broadcast CATV systems in Northern Canada used this conditional access system for many years. It is only occasionally used today on some satellite circuits because of its similarity to D2-MAC and B-MAC.

  • B-MAC

B-MAC has not been used for DTH applications since Primestar switched to an all-digital delivery system in the mid-1990s.

  • VideoCrypt

Analogue cut and rotate scrambling system with smartcard based conditional access system, used in 1990s by several European satellite broadcasters, mainly British Sky Broadcasting. Was also used by Sky New Zealand (Sky-NZ). One version of Videocrypt (VideoCrypt-S) had the capability of scrambling sound. A soft encryption option was also possible where the encrypted video could be transmitted with a fixed key and any VideoCrypt decoder could decode it.

  • RITC Discret 1

System based on horizontal line delay and audio scrambling. Each line of video was pseudorandomly delayed by either 0 nS, 902 nS or 1804 nS. (Line Delay) First used in 1984 by French channel Canal Plus, it was widely compromised after the December 1984 issue of "Radio Plans" magazine printed decoder plans.

  • SATPAC

Used by European channel FilmNet the SATPAC system interfered with the horizontal and vertical synchronization signals and transmitted a signal containing synchronization and authorization data on a separate subcarrier. The system was first used in September 1986 and saw many upgrades as it was easily compromised by pirates. By September 1992, FilmNet changed to D2-MAC EuroCrypt.

  • Telease MAAST / Sat-Tel SAVE

Added an interfering sine wave of a frequency (circa 93.750 kHz) to the video signal. This interfering signal was approximately six times the frequency of the horizontal refresh. It had an optional sound scrambling using Spectrum Inversion. Used in the UK by BBC for its world service broadcasts and by the now defunct UK movie channel "Premiere".

  • Payview III

Used by German/Swiss channel Teleclub in the early 1990s, this system employed various methods such as video inversion, modification of synchronization signals and a pseudo line delay effect.

  • D2-MAC EuroCrypt

Conditional Access system using the D2-MAC standard. Developed mainly by France Telecom, the system was smartcard based. The encryption algorithm in the smartcard was based on DES. It was one of the first smart card based systems to be compromised.

  • Nagravision analog system

An older Nagravision system for scrambling analog satellite and terrestrial television programs was used in the 1990s, for example by the German pay-TV broadcaster Premiere. In this line-shuffling system, 32 lines of the PAL TV signal are temporarily stored in both the encoder and decoder, and read out in permuted order under the control of a pseudorandom number generator. A smartcard security microcontroller (in a key-shaped package) decrypts data that is transmitted during the blanking intervals of the TV signal and extracts the random seed value needed for controlling the random number generation. The system also permitted the audio signal to be scrambled by inverting its spectrum at 12.5 kHz using a frequency mixer.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

It was called "In band gated sync scrambling".

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

I doubt seriously that anyone "down here" with any antenna, could grab a signal from a microwave link that is pointed *away* from terra firma.

Si, I agree with you. It had to be the downlink that got grabbed.

I think it may even have been a captured rebroadcast of a playback of a drone tape. So I have doubts that they actually grabbed one of our streams at all. They are too goddamned dumb.

They cannot even control themselves when they are around women that have more than their eyes available for viewing.

They should all die in a lake of pig's blood. In fact, they should be chased into said lake by a swine stampede.

Oh, the horror!

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

I want a rail-gun on mine.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

If you do not know something so utterly basic as a rail gun, you should move on to a different industry.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

No, it would not. It would add ONE component to the drone. The ground station already has the gear to decrypt it.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

I think you're a friggin' retard.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

Every viewpoint the retarded little bastard spewed was lame, so your capacity to discern an intelligent dialog lacks a bit.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

The real question is: "Do you even know what IS in current use?"

I have serious doubts that you do. Hardware level IP encryptors have been around AND in use for years, boy.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

NONE of the Predator's signals UP to the bird were intercepted.

The sat signal DOWN to the ground control station was.

Reply to
Archimedes' Lever

ESD, dimbulb.

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Reply to
Michael A. Terrell

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