"Strong mathematical platonism" is the idea that elements of the "domain of discourse the "universe of mathematical objects": _exist_, and furthermore that there's an eventual theory where we are of them, about the constant, consistent, complete, then _concrete_, since there's only one theory at all as universal why naturally according to reason then that for objects to exist that mathematical objects exist.
"Mathematical platonism" it's usually called, so commonly that it's even lower-cased like "euclidean" or "archimedean", then that "amicus Plato" is a usual account of idealism.
Without some kind of strong mathematical platonism then logicist positivism is at best "weak", as basically for the invincible ignorance of inductive inference.
Then, a "strong mathematical platonism", for the inter-objective as it were, makes for a "strong logicist positivism", for the inter-subjective as it is, then for something like a "strong mathematical universe hypothesis", where objects really are their numbers and names, not that we known them, yet that they "are".
... And that their relations are mathematical, so that basically mathematics "is" physics, the elements of the domain of discourse the universe of objects, as that mathematics "owes" physics, since physics has gotten away with itself.
Thus there are necessary accounts of both the idealistic tradition and analytic tradition.
All one theory, ..., a "mono-heno-theory" a "theatheory".
The "energy" and "entelechy" then are usual notions of the "point-wise" and "space-wise" the quantities. (Here "mass".)