That accident was caused by having extremely incompetent pilots at the controls, which in turn was maybe caused by a misplaced feeling of "the plane can fly itself anyway, the pilots are only there to monitor it".
These people should never have been allowed to fly a plane under those conditions (at night, above see, not clear weather, two cadets at the controls while the captain is resting).
Folklore has it that on long haul cross ocean flights, it isn't unusual for everybody on the flight deck to fall asleep.
Lasse Langwadt Christensen snipped-for-privacy@fonz.dk wrote:
Air France #447 - How Airbus SideStick Design Led To The Crash Of Air France Flight #447
At 02:10:05 UTC, the autopilot disengaged, most likely due to icing of the pitot tubes, and the aircraft transitioned from "normal law" to "alternate law 2".[65] The engines' autothrust systems disengaged three seconds later. As the PF, Bonin took over control of the aircraft, using the command language, "I have the controls." Without the autopilot, the aircraft started to roll to the right due to turbulence, and Bonin reacted by deflecting his side-stick to the left. One consequence of the change to alternate law was an increase in the aircraft's sensitivity to roll, and the pilot overcorrected. During the next 30 seconds, the aircraft rolled alternately left and right as he adjusted to the altered handling characteristics of the aircraft.[66] At the same time, he abruptly pulled back on his side-stick, raising the nose. This action has been described as unnecessary and excessive under the circumstances.[67] The aircraft's stall warning briefly sounded twice due to the angle-of-attack tolerance being exceeded, and the aircraft's indicated airspeed dropped sharply from 274 knots (507 km/h; 315 mph) to 52 knots (96 km/h; 60 mph). The aircraft's angle of attack increased, and subsequently began to climb above its cruising altitude of 35,000 ft (FL350). During this ascent, the aircraft attained vertical speeds well in excess of the typical rate of climb for the Airbus A330, which usually ascend at rates no greater than 2000 feet per minute (10 m/s). The aircraft experienced a peak vertical speed close to 7,000 feet per minute (36 m/s; 130 km/h),[66] which occurred as Bonin brought the rolling movements under control.
At 02:10:34 UTC, after displaying incorrectly for half a minute, the left- side instruments recorded a sharp rise in airspeed to 223 knots (413 km/h;
257 mph), as did the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS) 33 seconds later.[68] The right-side instruments were not recorded by the flight data recorder. The icing event had lasted for just over a minute,[69][70][3]:198 [71] yet Bonin continued to make nose-up inputs. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) moved from 3 to 13° nose-up in about one minute, and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.At 02:11:10 UTC, the aircraft had climbed to its maximum altitude around
38,000 feet (11,582 m). At this point, the aircraft's angle of attack was 16°, and the engine thrust levers were in the fully forward takeoff/go- around (TOGA) detent . As the aircraft began to descend, the angle of attack rapidly increased toward 30°. A second consequence of the reconfiguration into alternate law was that the stall protection no longer operated, whereas in normal law, the aircraft's flight-management computers would have acted to prevent such a high angle of attack.[72] The wings lost lift and the aircraft began to stall.[4][page needed]Confused, Bonin exclaimed, "[Expletive] I don't have control of the airplane any more now", and two seconds later, "I don't have control of the airplane at all!"[29] Robert responded to this by saying, "controls to the left", and took over control of the aircraft.[73][32] He pushed his side- stick forward to lower the nose and recover from the stall; however, Bonin was still pulling his side-stick back. The inputs cancelled each other out and triggered an aural "dual input" warning.
At 02:11:40 UTC, Captain Dubois re-entered the cockpit after being summoned by Robert. Noticing the various alarms going off, he asked the two crew members, "er what are you (doing)?"[32] The angle of attack had then reached 40°, and the aircraft had descended to 35,000 feet (10,668 m) with the engines running at almost 100% N1 (the rotational speed of the front intake fan, which delivers most of a turbofan engine's thrust). The stall warnings stopped, as all airspeed indications were now considered invalid by the aircraft's computer due to the high angle of attack.[74] The aircraft had its nose above the horizon, but was descending steeply.
Roughly 20 seconds later, at 02:12 UTC, Bonin decreased the aircraft's pitch slightly. Airspeed indications became valid, and the stall warning sounded again; it then sounded intermittently for the remaining duration of the flight, stopping only when the pilots increased the aircraft's nose-up pitch. From there until the end of the flight, the angle of attack never dropped below 35°. From the time the aircraft stalled until its impact into the ocean, the engines were primarily developing either 100% N1 or TOGA thrust, though they were briefly spooled down to about 50 percent N1 on two occasions. The engines always responded to commands and were developing in excess of 100 percent N1 when the flight ended. Robert responded to Dubois by saying, "We've lost all control of the aeroplane, we don’t understand anything, we’ve tried everything".[32] Soon after this, Robert said to himself, "climb" four consecutive times. Bonin heard this and replied, "But I've been at maximum nose-up for a while!" When Captain Dubois heard this, he realized Bonin was causing the stall, and shouted, "No no no, don't climb! No No No!"[75][32]
When Robert heard this, he told Bonin to give him control of the airplane. [3] In response to this, Bonin temporarily gave the controls to Robert.[32] [75][3] Robert pushed his side-stick forward to try to regain lift for the airplane to climb out of the stall. However, the aircraft was too low to recover from the stall. Shortly thereafter, the ground proximity warning system sounded an alarm, warning the crew about the aircraft's imminent crash with the ocean. In response, Bonin (without informing his colleagues) pulled his side-stick all the way back again,[32][3] and said, "[Expletive] We're going to crash! This can't be true. But what's happening?"[75][32][3] [76][29] The last recording on the CVR was Dubois saying, "(ten) degrees pitch attitude."
Kid In The Cockpit | Aeroflot Flight 593
Unfortunately, the pilots were unable to understand the HSI indications and fly the plane; the russian planes HSI operation was opposite.
In a car, you are parked serenly on the side of a road and have all the time in the world to play.
In an airplane in an emergency, you are too busy. When the engine quits at
25,000 feet, you start to lose cabing pressure since the turbos are no longer running. In a smaller plane like a Cessna 152, the engine will windmill and probably clear itself. In a Malibu, the engine is much bigger and simply quits turning.I don't know if the prop pitch control works with the engine stopped so you could find a pitch angle that spins the engine, but again, you are too busy to play with it. I didn't feel that using the battery to try to start the engine would work because the air is so thin at altitude there isn't much chance of clearing the engine. It is the same as driving to Pike's Peak in Colorado, which is about 15,000 feet. In a normally aspirated engine, the engine runs very rough and loses power. It would be very hard to start if you managed to flood it.
Back in the plane, you have the gear out to increase the drag and pointed the nose down to increase the descent rate so you can get down to breathable altitude before the cabin loses pressure. But the most you can get safely is around 4,000 feet per minute. At 25,000 feet, it will take about 3 minutes to get down to breathable altitude, which is manageable. There are oxygen bottles under the seats, but these cost $600 each to replace so you try to not have to use them.
Meanwhile, you have contacted the tower and declared an emergency. You have clearance to land, but there is a lot more going on than simply drifting down through the clouds. You are checking for other A/C, you have turned on all the lights including the cabin lights, you are planning the landing approach, checking to see you have enough altitude to make the runway, checking to see if there is anything else you need to do, and doing all the thousands of other things to get back on the ground safely. There isn't time to play with the engine. You are too busy.
After we landed, the ground personnel tried to start the engine, but it was too badly flooded and they had to tow the aircraft off the runway and back to the apron. So if it wouldn't start on the ground, it certainly wouldn't start at altitude.
After I bought the Malibu, I bought a little Cessna 152 so any of my employees could learn how to fly. One day the manager of my CAD department came back from lunch drenched in sweat. I said, "Ha, you soloed. Better than sex, isn't it?"
She replied with a resounding "YES!"
I recommend anyone with a bit of spare time learn how to fly. There is no other human experience like it.
With gliders a normal procedure to loose height fast is to spin. In a fully developed spin you are loosing ~400ft/s. The descent rate is initially lower, which is just as well as normal training allows spin entry at 1000ft AGL (or typically 3 spin+recoveries from a 2000ft launch :) ).
In the UK gliders regularly fly at 20kft. IIRC oxygen is advised above 10kft and mandatory above 12kft.
Alternatively, it ensures that wives know their husbands don't have/need a mistress.
Well, have a trial lesson at least!
Yes, I have read that story as well. It was very clear that Bonin was totally unable to fly a plane under manual control, a situation he was suddenly put in because of the pitot tube issue. Anyone who had done basic flying training would know not to pull back the stick in a stall, but Bonin still did that. He was completely programmed to fly an automated plane where stick input is only an indication of the pilot's desire and the actual plane will do what is required to achieve that. This is how it normally works in an Airbus, and that is what he was familiar with.
The Airbus designers could be criticized for changing the behavior of the plane automatically, but probably when it was not that way (and remember, the automatic way was not available due to lack of sensor input), this pilot probably would not have known how to act anyway. He was just a busdriver that had received some bus driver training but would not be able to drive a car on an icy road.
When the computer runs out of ideas there not much else it can do but relinquish control to the pilot and tell him to fly the plane But if the pilot isn't used to flying manually other than in a simulator that might not end well. retired fighterpilots might be better in that regard, but watching "aircrash investigation" there's also a number of those who have needlessly insisted on flying manually and making mistakes that a computer wouldn't have
Or at some major airports. When the ADS-B extenions finally ran out last year there were still major airports that did not have ADS-B setup for the controllers. So mandate was for planes, not FAA or contract towers, if you can believe that.
A modern ATC tower really feels more like a musuem when it comes to the equipment. It all works, likely for many decades as can be seen from the stuff in use. The FAA actually does a pretty good job though. I've had to deal with them for random things and they're one of the better federal agencies.
It's still just garbage airbus design where apparently pilot and copilot can fight over the controls with no haptic feedback that they're even doing so. Tacking on another alarm isn't helpful. Even on a cessna, you can fight over the controls, but you will both feel it. Chains and cables are superior to any euro-committee design.
Americans still aren't over the fact that Airbus made the better plane...
There are always details that can be done better, in this case some alarm when both sidesticks are in use.
What about the Boeing MAX where the pilot and THE PLANE could fight over the controls? At least Airbus does not have that problem.
it has a warning and there is a priority switch to have either left or right controls have sole control of the airplane.
from when Sully ditched in the Hudson,
15:27:26.5 priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs when the sidestick priority button is activated on the Captain's sidestick]afaict on Boeing the controls even on fly-by-wire planes are mechanically connected so they don't add, the strongest pilot wins. But they can be disconnected with the side effect that some control surfaces are only controlled by the controls on the same side
They didn't.
So you're saying yet another alarm going off in stressfull situation is the solution? Stupid.
Fair enough. The vertical stabilizers just snap off the airbuses as they crash into the ocean. It's completely automatic. Heck, there was probably an alarm for that too.
This pilot for Colgan Air just fought the stick-pusher until the plane crashed, all he had to do to save the plane was just follow its lead:
Utterly creepy how this plane goes down in near silence on the CVR with the crew almost blase about the situation til the end.
Of course we will get the same issues in cars when the self-driving becomes standard and the drivers license will become even more of a formality than it already is in some countries.
When you are not teached how to control a car in normal and abnormal circumstances, and when you never practice these things because the car normally drives itself anyway, at some point in time you will crash because either the car systems malfunction, or they get in circumstances that the software cannot handle. The driver at the controls either is not paying attention, or he/she is not able to solve the situation because they have not learned it or have not practiced in enough.
However, that does not mean that as a whole the world becomes less safe! It may well be that all the time when the system behaves normally (no matter if on a large plane, a small plane, a car) it works so much better than manual control that it saves many more lifes in that operation than the few lifes that get lost when the system malfunctions.
Still, people will focus on the malfunctions and criticize the systems.
Have something to add? Share your thoughts — no account required.
Ask the community — no account required