Boeing 737 Max design error

I don't actually like my women to come with owners/instruction manuals. Where's the fun in that?

Reply to
bitrex
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Does this link work?

You would be lucky to have the wings stall rather than be torn off.

Reply to
Banders

Of course you did. You proposed another complication to intervene, the cutter-offer.

It's very reasonable and used widely in all kinds of aircraft, where in an emergency you can hand crank, eg landing gear. And we know it worked, the LA flight the day before the crash did it.

And above you deny that you introduced any new complications.

Do you have any relatives working at Boeing on the 737 Max program?

Reply to
trader4

Wrong, always wrong.

Reply to
trader4

Thank you. You shouldn't even have to ask him what he means. One thing I've noted is that those that don't want to contribute, but only want to stir up trouble, are the ones that post one or three word replies, like "wrong", or "this is incorrect" and nothing more.

Reply to
trader4

as

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n.

That is wrong, the engines are mounted further forward.

and

Which of course is what I described.

That isn't true. If it was, Boeing would have to go through a new type certification, which was one key thing they wanted to avoid, for obvious reasons. They wanted pilots that already have a rating for the 737 to be able to fly it, no new rating required. They took most of the existing 737 design and used that. One big change was the need to go to the larger, more fuel efficient engines.

but

And part of that is that without MCAS, the Max has a nasty tendency to continue to pitch up on it's own, which near the stall limit, could push it into a stall. It's not a good new feature, it's one that's a problem.

It's not clear that anyone went out of their box, unless you know what exactly happened during the design and changes at Boeing.

Reply to
trader4

And just yesterday we learned that Boeing learned way back in 2017 that the AOA disagree light didn't work unless the plane had the AOA display option. So there was a warning light bulb that would not go on, unless that plane had the AOA display option, which they were charging for. Boeing planned to fix it in a software update, but that never happened before the crashes. Previously it was said that they offered the disagree light and the display as options. Putting this together, it sounds like you could pay for the disagree light, but it didn't actually work, unless you had the display option too.

It certainly looks like there was a cozy relationship. But on the other hand, if Boeing didn't tell the FAA that they had increased the action by 3X, IDK how FAA would know.

Have to be careful there about which problem you're talking about. This is about the AOA disagree light not working in some planes, which I talked about above. Not sure what level of urgency was needed to fix that, given that many of the Max apparently don't have the disagree light at all. I'd say they should have put out an alert to operators though. Doesn't seem like that would have made a difference in the crashes though, from what I saw. For one thing, pilots were never told about MCAS, how it uses the AOA sensors, etc. Which raises the question, on the planes that had the disagree light, what did the pilots thing the AOA and this light all about? Many planes didn't display AOA, so then what's up with the light and WTF were they supposed to think that it was for?

If the pilots knew about MCAS and had a working disagree light, I wonder what would have happened with the crash flights. LA taxied out with one AOA showing 20 deg, so if it had the light and if the light worked, what would they have done?

+1

I posed the challenge to the dissenters here to show us how a plane that's been flying level for 30 secs at 300 MPH can suddenly be stalling. Of course the more complex you make the software to decide between normal and abnormal, the more failure that can induce. Seems a far better solution is that if the two AOA disagree, then MCAS turns itself off and notifies the pilots. Or put in a third one and vote.

Well, that's a damn good point too. I said before that since the trouble started just as the flaps came off, when the pilots couldn't figure out what was going on, you'd think trying flaps again might be a logical idea. But what you raise doesn't make Boeing look very smart again. Because on takeoff, just after the flaps have been retracted, it would sure be a hell of a lot easier to re-deploy them to disable MCAS than to turn off the trim and try to wind it back from nose down, with limited altitude. I wonder if Boeing had made that the procedure, if the Ethiopian pilots would have done it? Maybe not, I don't think there is any evidence anything was said about MCAS. But I agree that telling pilots that using flaps is an option would have been a good idea. I guess they at least did tell the pilots that MCAS only works with no flaps, so pilots might have picked it up that way.

Yes, it will be interesting. And interesting to see if it winds up with any criminal charges, which seems unlikely so far.

Reply to
trader4

I looked into how it's designed. Looks like the cables from the trim wheels drive the trim mechanism directly, as do a motor. So you're right.

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Reply to
trader4

Bear in mind that trader4 appears not to have any experience of flying aircraft, and hence no experience of the strange unexpected meteorological effects that can be encountered.

Even with my limited experience, I've been in situations which have surprised co-pilots that have been an instructor for over half a century.

But I'm sure trader4 won't let that reality deter him from his confident announcements about how aircraft do (and don't) fly.

Reply to
Tom Gardner

One important one is when there is zero wing loading, either because the plane is in a parabolic arc (think "vomit comet" :) ) or because the stick is pushed forward sufficiently for the plane to be "forced over the top at 0G".

Reply to
Tom Gardner

im wheel won't the electric trim be useless as well?

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on-Normal Operations/Flight Controls, sub heading Manual Stabilizer trim:

ts to correct mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamic ally relieve the air loads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelera te towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually."

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Probably for simplicity and because MCAS could run amok at altitude too. But I agree, adding to the instructions that extending flaps as an option would seem a good idea and it;s simple and would work fast, unlike winding trim wheels. This fatal trap is a perfect setup. No checking by the software for incorrect AOA reading while on the ground. Rely on just one, it's stuck at 20 deg. So, you takeoff and at low altitude you retract the flaps and wham, plane goes amok, trying to dive into the ground. It's just stunning that could come out of Boeing. And if it could happen on this program, why not on other new Boeing planes?

Reply to
trader4

Now put the aircraft in, say, a turn where it is pulling 1G. What direction does the MEMS sensor indicate is "down"?

I've done turns at 3G for a minute or so, and "down" definitely wasn't towards the earth!

Reply to
Tom Gardner

w a 737

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So then explain to us how a 737 that's been flying for 30 secs at 300 MPH in level flight can suddenly stall, requiring MCAS to activate. Cite for us when this has happened.

You're just sore because I have the facts and also hold the pilots partly responsible for what happened. Out of 7, at least 4 could not identify a runaway trim problem and take the simple steps, that are supposed to be a memory item, to deal with it.

Reply to
trader4

It would help if you had some experience flying aircraft.

It would help if you had been taught by competent instructors that require you to recover after an aircraft has "departed controlled flight", because such conditions can easily be encountered, must be recognised, and dealt with.

Since you have neither, trying to educate you would be a waste of our time.

If you are prepared to educate yourself, I suggest Wolfgang Langewiesche's "Stick and Rudder; An Explanation of the Art of Flying".

Reply to
Tom Gardner

Typical. After getting nasty and disagreeing, now you admit there are indeed identifiable situations where we know the plane can't be stalling, which of course is exactly what I said. So now answer the question. We know from flight data that a 737 has been traveling level at 300 MPH for 30 secs. Can it be stalling?

Reply to
trader4

In other words, the answer is that it can't be stalling and you know it. If not, I'll reissue the challenge, explain to us how a 737 that's been flying level for 30 secs can suddenly be stalling......

You're like an incompetent mechanic or HVAC tech that thinks only they can understand anything about fixing cars or HVAC systems. They get all pissed off when they find out that there are bright people who know the facts, can sort out truth from BS and actually fix their own cars and HVAC. And then they get sore, real sore. You're sore too because I put part of the blame for the accidents on the pilots, who could not identify runaway trim and follow the procedure. That's a fact.

Reply to
trader4

It would help if you had been taught by competent instructors that require you to recover after an aircraft has "departed controlled flight", because such conditions can easily be encountered, must be recognised, and dealt with.

Since you have neither, trying to educate you would be a waste of our time.

If you are prepared to educate yourself, I suggest Wolfgang Langewiesche's "Stick and Rudder; An Explanation of the Art of Flying".

Reply to
Tom Gardner

I'm not sore, but I don't have the time to educate you in how aircraft do (and don't) fly.

It would help if you had some experience of flying aircraft.

It would help if you had been taught by competent instructors that require you to recover after an aircraft has "departed controlled flight", because such conditions can easily be encountered, must be recognised, and dealt with.

*Since you have neither, trying to educate you would be a waste of our time.* *If you are prepared to educate yourself*, I suggest Wolfgang Langewiesche's "Stick and Rudder; An Explanation of the Art of Flying".
Reply to
Tom Gardner

there is a speed limit for extending flaps

Reply to
Lasse Langwadt Christensen

snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:de422837-121d-4ec2-a304- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

More proof that you are an idiot. A screw is a very precise engineering design. The threads utilize the shear strength of the material they are cut on to move huge elements requiring huge forces with a mere rotational force. Screw threads impart linear change in a per turn manner. Each rotation moves the screw one thread pitch further. Tons of linear force and movement force IS applied and it does not require tons of force in the screw's rotation.

You prove over and over that you do not have the mechanical aptitude to even be in the discussion.

IF there were your special "hydraulic assist" mechanisms in place, then there would be no need for the manual dial at all. The pilot could merely activate the recovery switch and hold it until the dial back finishes.

That would actually work.

But you certainly do not know enough about the mechanical realm to even make valid speculations. You failed to keep your weight down... You failed at 'trading'. You have absolutely zero grasp of physics. What is next, child? You gonna give the whole group a primer on how hard it is to turn a screw?

Reply to
DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno

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