You'll never get anywhere attempting to debate with these bottom-feeders, mate.
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They self certified and the FAA were in bed with them. Not a proper independent certification that the thing was truly airworthy. I hope that the truth will eventually be told. I doubt if any international aviation authority will take FAA certification at face value after this.
I think a case for negligence in the design and implementation of the MCAS system and its lack of documentation in the as released plane and flight manuals would be compelling. I also expect Boeing will be able to employ expensive fat slimy lawyers to get them off the hook though.
It also appears on the face of it that their remedial procedure did not work either since by the time the crew have reacted the plane is already descending too fast & too steep for them to move the manual trim wheels.
-- Regards, Martin Brown
What Cursitor Doom "knows" is rather like what krw "knows" - some bizarre delusion that some right-wing propaganda site has managed to lodge in his head.
Evidence-based facts don't get a look in. Where's the fun in agreeing with the saner members of the population?
-- Bill Sloman, Sydney
If so, then what will they do? Demand that all Boeing planes be certified by each foreign authority? Seems unlikely. Having some foreign observers with the FAA might be a good idea though.
I wonder if there have ever been other crashes where runaway trim happened so suddenly and forcefully that the pilots were not able to recover via the manual trim process on 737 or other planes? That raises questions about safety and certification of at least all 737s no? Since it's called "runaway trim", you would assume that it means that the trim motor can respond to a short, stuck switch, etc and go to full trim in one direction or the other. Question is, how many seconds does that take? Because it looks like if it goes nose down, airspeed increases, within some short period airspeed will have reached the point where the manual trim can't be used. Boeing had instructions in the manual about how to deal with that, but that process wasn't reassuring, it would have required the plane to be put into an even steeper dive. And if any of this happens at 5K feet, good luck with that. Even at higher altitude, if you don't get this right within seconds, looks like the chances of survival are slim. So, I wonder if there have been other incidents? Or is runaway trim where it really does go full trim, so rare and that's why we haven't heard about it before?
snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:1b9cc817-2b24-4f20-b534- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
Self certification through a regulating authority is nothing new.
Underwriters Laboratories have had it for decades. Most major makers of nearly any product you can name self certify their UL compliance and place the mark of said certification.
Until and unless they have a major failure that would indictate being due to an element the UL labs would scrutinize heavily, that company loses its self cert capacity.
You guys are so far behind the process. It is really amazing the gossip spew these accidents have caused.
No one here said this was anything new. But it sure looks like something went badly wrong with MCAS and the FAA. And it leads to the question of what else got certified by that process that should not have, which could be in any other planes, not just the 737 Max. Boeing came up with a totally flawed, stupid design. This wasn't some unexpected component failure or similar, it was a total, stunning design failure. Somehow Boeing allowed that to happen and to go into production. FAA somehow certified it. And even in 2017 Boeing didn't wake up when they learned that the disagree lights, if installed, did not work unless the aircraft also had the AOA display option. So there was a warning light in some of those planes that did nothing. They never informed the operators. All major failures that need to be fully investigated so we find out what exactly went wrong and fix it.
Sabena flight 548 in 1961 was believed to be runaway trim and is why there are now two series connected trim motor disconnect switches. One theory was that their one disconnect switch had welded closed and prevented isolating an upstream fault.
piglet
Let me help you:
"I don't know, but cylinder sounds right to me." is my response to your emphatic "they used a hydraulic PISTON. Which of course is what we actually call it."
Air loads retracted the slats. Fixed by adding hydraulic fuses.
Left wing stalled, because the crew slowed to what they thought was the appropriate speed. They could have retracted the right wing slats and held a slightly greater speed instead.
Overruled. You're an argumentative know-nothing.
Did your buddy DL talk about hydraulic fuses? No, he wanted the horizontal stabilizer driven by a simple piston, so it could be instantly cutoff and freed to solve a mostly non-existent problem. Sylvia had to explain to him that would leave the control surface flapping in the wind.....
BS. One engine fell off on the runway and the procedure is certainly not to slow, it's to climb at V2. That's what they did. Nor did they have time to do much of anything, it crashed less than a minute after takeoff.
With the slats retracted on the failed engine side, they never had a chance to get to a speed that would have prevented it from stalling. That's kind of why the slats and flaps are there to begin with. And the crash investigations showed exactly what I said, that MD relied on piston actuators, the engine separation severed hydraulic lines, the slats retracted. Had they been jackscrews instead, the plane would have flown, because the slats would not have retracted. That was the whole point, but it obviously went right over your head.
Next!
It already proved itself flyable.
"Flight 191 lifted off about 6,000 feet down the runway, climbed out in a wings level attitude, and reached an altitude of about 300 feet agl with its wings still level."
The first officer had followed the flight director and raised the nose to 14 degrees, which reduced the airspeed from 165 knots (190 mph; 306 km/h) to the takeoff safety airspeed (V2) of 153 knots (176 mph; 283 km/h), the speed at which the aircraft could safely climb after sustaining an engine failure.[1]:53-54 However, the engine separation had severed the hydraulic fluid lines that controlled the leading edge slats on the left wing and locked them in place, causing the outboard slats (immediately left of the No. 1 engine) to retract under air load. The retraction of the slats raised the stall speed of the left wing to approximately 159 knots (183 mph; 294 km/h), 6 knots (6.9 mph; 11 km/h) higher than the prescribed takeoff safety airspeed (V2) of 153 knots (176 mph; 283 km/h). As a result, the left wing entered a full aerodynamic stall.
Since it was no longer possible to abort the takeoff after the loss of the engine, the crew followed the standard operating procedure for an "engine out" climb. This procedure is to climb at the takeoff safety airspeed (V2) and attitude (angle), as directed by the flight director. The partial electrical power failure (produced by the separation of the left No. 1 engine) meant that neither the stall warning nor the slat retraction indicator was operative. The crew, therefore, did not know that the slats on the left wing were retracting. This retraction significantly raised the stall speed of the left wing. Thus flying at the takeoff safety airspeed caused the left wing to stall while the right wing was still producing lift, so the aircraft banked sharply and uncontrollably to the left. In simulator recreations held after the accident it was determined that "had the pilot maintained excess airspeed the accident may not have occurred."[1]
snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
I suggested "freeing" the cylinder by way of valving.
You are a jerk, plain and simple.
Pretty poor communication in that cockpit. Did the CVR have them speaking English? "Mine has also toppled, looks fine."? What does *that* mean?? Captain followed the one failed instrument, when there were three others to crosscheck against. Flight Engineer (Italian?) was the only one who was on the ball.
Look what happened here.
Airline horror as airport worker is killed by being sucked into plane engine
"A pilot misinterpreted a signal and switched on the plane's engine."
Yes, it is the same story. Because gyro instrument failures are expected, nothing uncommon about them. While attitude indicators are vacuum or +pressure powered, the turn-&-bank indicator is electrical, so there will almost surely be at least one instrument left if things go really bad. Captain Kukar should have been able to fly with no attitude indicators, just a turn-&-bank indicator.
Would it have been different with an Indian judge?
No shit Sherlock. That was with the leading edge slats deployed. Then with the hydraulic lines damaged, the system bled out, the slats retracted and it crashed. From rotation to impact was 50 seconds.
Thanks for telling me what I told you. You implied that the pilot deliberately reduced the speed, committing some kind of error. In fact, he simply followed the engine out takeoff procedure, which is what I told you.
What's incredible here is that you accuse me of being argumentative? I simply stated that this DC-10 crash is an example of what happens when you have a simple piston design, like DL proposed for the trim on the 737. It's absolutely correct, if that DC-10 had used a jackscrew for the slats, the plane would have flown. And that was over with several days ago. Yet here you are, arguing the minutia, that has nothing to do with it. Meanwhile, you have nothing to say to DL about the silly idea of his piston cutter-offer design, which would leave the horizontal stabilizer flapping in the wind, as Sylvia pointed out. Or all his other BS, like saying that all large aircraft use piston actuated flaps, when in fact most, including the 737s use jackscrews. Or that the B1 bomber has had many crashes caused by fly-by-wire, yet he can't produce a single example. No, not a word about any of that.
After you "free it", then like Sylvia said, the control surface would be left flapping in the wind. And I don't recall any mention of valving. If you think it's such a great idea, contact Boeing, I'm sure they will be happy to redesign the 737 fleet.
Seems a bit questionable to me. It's not as if the engines start instantly, and they have the rotating spiral on the front to show when they're turning.
I dare say someone was sucked in, but I'd say the explanation will turn out to be more than just that the pilot started the engine when not expected to.
Sylvia
snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
NO, it would not! The rate at which it moves can be controlled in hardware by the valving, and no it does not nor would not "flap in the wind".
Damn boy. Learn to read. Not connected would be "free to flap".
Opened valving would be "free to return to normal before re- engaging control assist" in a controlled rate and manner.
Nice backpedal... not.
Like I said, you never read the entire thread, and you still refuse to believe even that fact.
Oh boy! You're a real mature Usenet poster now! NOT!
Grow up, you retarded piece of shit.
I didn't imply it.
"the procedure is certainly not to slow, it's to climb at V2."
That's you, not understanding that slowing doesn't mean that you're not climbing. And you are still too dishonest to accept that the pilot slowed to V2.
"BS. One engine fell off on the runway and the procedure is certainly not to slow, it's to climb at V2. That's what they did."
"The part about agree lights and electrica things not working is pure BS."
Do you just make stuff up to win? I also gave you a link to a thunderstorm diagram after you scoffed at the idea that any wind shear on this planet could stall a 300mph plane, and you had no comment. You simply moved the goalpost and continued arguing.
Even birds know that.
"It is understood efforts are ongoing to remove the body from the engine of the Airbus."
They can just run water or walnut shells into the running engine to clean it out. Really.
I understand exactly what happened. That DC-10 crashed because it used a hydraulic piston which retracted the slats when the engine that came off and severed hydraulic lines. If it had used a jackscrew design, that would not have happened, the slats would not have retracted, the plane would have FLOWN! THAT was my point. All your doing is BS nitpicking, that has absolutely NOTHING to do with the very clear, direct and factual point I made. And to top it off, you accuse me of being argumentative? Now that's a classic! And again, DL has made one post after another that's factually incorrect and you say NOTHING. You DL and Bill should go get a room.
Your comprehension of jet engines seems fairly limited.
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