>>> What does the owner's authorization get you?
>>>
>>> Assume for the moment that the TPM is being used by an application
>>> to store the keys for some copyrighted content. The application
>>> wants to enforce a limited number of plays, and an expiration date.
>>> It also wants to make sure that the OS hasn't been patched to log
>>> traffic to the sound and video hardware. As I understand it, this
>>> is one of the things the TPM is supposed to be able to do (hide
>>> data from the owner against his interests in favor of the interests
>>> of the copyright holder).
>>
>>In that case the owner of the computer is not the owner of the TPM.
>
>Well, maybe that was the intent, but my bet is that there's going
>to be at least one user out there who manages to become the owner
>of his own TPM. It might even be someone with access to a chip
>design facility, or who works for the manufacturer.
>
>Does the application know who owns the TPM? If it trusts the TPM
>owned by the user, it sounds like it's going to give away the farm,
>and there's a good chance the keys will be posted on the Internet.
>
>There's also the problem that there are multiple sets of content
>providers and they don't all trust each other.
The talk of "ownership" is confusing the issue. There is no such concept in TPM. If TPM is turned on and you load Windows, then Windows "owns" all the hardware including the TPM chip, and of course Microsoft owns Windows. If TPM is turned on and you load Linux, then Linux "owns" all the hardware including the TPM chip, and you own your copy of Linux.
Note the "if TPM is turned on" qualifier. The BIOS is responsible for turning on the TPM chip. At power-on, the BIOS either activates the TPM chip (and then does various other things) or deactivates the TPM chip, in which case it remains deactivated until the next power cycle. No operating system or application can reactivate it without cycling the power.
Can TPM "hide data from the owner against his interests in favor of the interests of a copyright holder?" If the owner tells the BIOS to turn on TPM and then loads an OS that does the above (I am looking at you, Vista) yes. If the owner disables TPM in the Bios or loads an OS that doesn't do the above, then no.
What the TPM chip is really good at is storing certain data (keys) and not letting it out unless it gets matching hashes that tell it that the same BIOS, extension BIOSes, MBR, GRUB bootstrap stages / Windows bootloader and other designated files such as the Linux or Windows kernel are the same as what stored the data. This stops you from booting to a Knoppix CD and extracting the keys from Windows. This also stops you from removing a Linux hard drive, mounting it as a secondary drive on a Windows box and extracting the keys. It also stops you from changing the OS without powering down and extracting the keys from RAM.
Can the TPM chip be used for Evil? Yes, but only if you (or whoever owns your operating system) allow that.
I strongly suggest reading at least the first few URLs below:
_Taking Control of TCPA_
_Linux and trusted computing_
_The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Specs/FAQ_ (From the people who make TPM chips, so consider the source)
_OSLO - Open Secure LOader_
_A Tipping Point For The Trusted Platform Module?_
Microsoft's _Best Practices for Trusted Platform Module Management_
_TPM Reset Attack_
Wikipedia: _ Trusted Platform Module / Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TPM/TCPA) _