Semi OT We need to invent a public key system for voting

Someone can get rich with this idea...

Some kind of public/ private key cryptography system..

where you make up your own secret password and are given a secret password or some combination of the two

and you use it when you vote...

After the election, ALL the results are published publicly so everyone can check the published list and verify that their own vote was counted correctly in the list

of course the published list does NOT have any ID that anyone else but you can tell who it is.

In other words, everyone can see the entire list and verify their own vote on the list, but no one else can id who it is...

and we can all see the total number of votes and the totals for each candidate.

seems doable to me

what say you?

Reply to
makolber
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How can anyone verify if "illegal voters" haven't inserted entries?

Reply to
Frank Miles

Absolutely agree. Also need proof of citizenship and biometric ID to vote.

Reply to
tom

You are *way* behind the curve on this; people have been investigating electronic voting systems for many decades.

If you want to *begin* to understand the subject domain, what has been considered, its characteristics, and problems, use the search facility on

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Reply to
Tom Gardner

No, we don't.

Reply to
krw

That's just *racist*.

Reply to
krw

The dead will still vote...

Reply to
Robert Baer

We have 50 different systems, here (probably even more as I am sure Guam, Marshall Islands, etc. each have their own idea of how to do it). Each state sets up its own requirements and mechanisms.

Some places use paper ballots with pen-and-ink -- and count the votes with human eyeballs.

Others are entirely electronic (stewpit!).

Here, we use a paper ballot with "color in the circles". The ballots are then scanned on your exit of the polling place (though no scanners in evidence at this last cycle so policy may have changed -- collect the paper ballots and scan them elsewhere?)

However, it's a stupid approach. The individual ballots are expensive (large oversized sheets of heavier "card stock" instead of small slips of paper -- hard to get 40+ questions on a small slip of paper *and* the voter's response to each of those!). Our ballots are typically ~24" x 9" and double-sided.

There is no indication at the polling place that your ballot may not have been counted as you THOUGHT (e.g., if you mismark it, that vote is voided -- but you aren't alerted of this, EVER!)

If you forget to fill out the back side of the ballot, you just cheated yourself out of those voting opportunities. No way to alert you to that fact (since no one is SUPPOSED to be looking at your ballot)

No way to make the print larger for folks who have poorer vision -- ballot would have to be even larger still!

Folks with ET or PT may have problems coloring in the small circles to indicate their choices: remember all the warnings about being careful when doing this on "standardized tests"? (10% of men over 50 have ET...)

Marking pens dry out and get "smushed" so the tip isn't as well defined (you're trying to color in the circles, not make large X's on a YES/NO single-item ballot!)

Requires a custom designed "ballot scanner" to read the ballots (you mean to tell me you can't do this with some COTS piece of hardware *if* the software -- running on a COTS *tablet* that you buy in lots of thousands per municipality -- can print a "receipt" in an easily machine-read form??!). If that scanner (one per polling place) fails, you resort to collecting and SECURING paper ballots (the scanner secures them as part of the scanning process).

As the ballot must be so physically large, it is relatively easy (once you've seen 5 or 10 of them AS YOU COLLECT THEM FROM VOTERS EXITING THE POLLING PLACE) for folks to determine how you've voted (no, not all 40+ questions but if you're interested in a particular ballot item (e.g., president), you KNOW where to glance at the ballot to ascertain which "dot" is filled in!

[The folks running your local polling place are typically your NEIGHBORS! I.e., probably MORE likely to express an interest in YOUR ballot than some "stranger" from the other side of town]

Polling places can run out of ballots because they are "special pieces of paper" not easily replaced (folks waiting for a new shipment to be fetched are... WAITING!)

INDEPENDENTLY designing an alternative "vote tallying device" (as protection against the "other" design having been compromised) is an expensive option (all proprietary, CLOSED hardware and software).

All of these are easily addressed with my up-thread suggestion. But, the folks making these decisions are politicians -- barely capable of doing anything PRODUCTIVE, hence their desire to "get on the public dole" -- where they don't HAVE to! :> (never solve a problem because then you won't be able to solve it AGAIN!)

Reply to
Don Y

d

IIRR public key encryption depends on having a secret key (which is never d isclosed, only used) and a public key. The minimum secure key length was 10

24 bits - 256 hexadecimal characters - back when I was last paying an inter est. They are made up as pairs - you don't make up your own secret key.

Tying the secret key to your personal DNA (which is what you require for th e personal identification system which has to be part of a voting system) s trikes me as difficult.

How?

No secret ballot then? Or only you can check whether your ballot was record ed correctly? Presumably you could delete a vote that you regretted or clai med not to have made, but you wouldn't be able to switch it to another cand idate.

Only if it is you.

Granting that your ideas about public key encryption are inadequate, one ca n guess that the rest of the program has similar problems.

--
Bill Sloman, Sydney
Reply to
bill.sloman

What? no modern technology like magnifying lenses? or eye-glasses? really?

Here national governemnt ballots are small (say A5 sized) singled sided, and have about 10 to 20 options on them, it's folded closed before being posted into the ballot box.

the local government ballot (city council, health board etc) much larger and has maybe 160 options on it, but this one is not taken at a polling place but mailed out to registered voters. (although you can vote in person if you lost your ballot or didn't register early enough etc...)

yeah, printing on both sides is a fail if it's meant to be a secret vote.

also conspiracy theories circulate as to the reason for the undersupply..

--
This email has not been checked by half-arsed antivirus software
Reply to
Jasen Betts

Do you bring your reading glasses when you're out DRIVING? Many of the old folks, here, have had cataract surgery in one or both eyes. Typically, a single focus lens -- set for distance. I.e., ALL of them need reading glasses.

Should the polling place stock "readers" for the convenience of its patrons?

Typically, we combine city, county, state and national elections into a single ballot. So, the ballot in my town will be different from the ballot in another town -- yet share some "items".

Here (city), we vote on at least once a year (I think there can be up to three votes in a year).

Nationally, we vote every two years (the "House" is reelected, in its entirety, every two years; president every 4; Senate every 6). Our local (city) elections are on "off years". Plus "ballot initiatives (which may originate in our legislature *or* from citizen petitions) .

Some states conduct their vote entirely by mail.

Or, when you have to physically hand it to someone (because they think you're unable to slip it into a slot in the motorized reader!)

We have "security sleeves" available -- sometimes! This is essentially a lightweight cardboard (durable/reusable) folder into which you place your ballot (the folder is as large as the ballot; ballot is never folded lest it jam the machine) as you walk across the room to deliver it to the "tabulator" machine. By holding onto the crease portion of the folder and presenting the "open" end of the folder to the machine, it can grab the ballot and pull it from the folder/sleeve without the ballot ever being visible (to the poll worker standing beside you).

I use these sleeves. Many folks don't.

Yet, one year, had a poll worker cheerfully take my ballot FROM the sleeve to feed into the machine! (Um, do you think the folder was designed as a "transportation convenience"? Did ANYONE teach you your responsibilities, as a poll worker?)

For something as conceptually simple as casting ballots, there are surprisingly many things that go wrong. Part of the problem is that it is not a "full time job" -- it happens infrequently so folks don't get much practice at it. The folks who do it tend to be old geezers who can afford to waste a day sitting there (you MUST stay until the polling place closes and you are "released" from your service -- regardless of how long that takes! I.e., it's at least a 10 hour day). Polling places change all the time so where you cast your vote THIS time may be very different from where you do it NEXT time.

E.g., we used to vote up at the local public library. Until, one year, no one showed up to unlock the door when the polls were *scheduled* to open. So, some election official took it on himself to break the glass window and let himself in (to open the polls!). I guess that didn't sit well with the folks at the library (different budget, different fiefdom, etc.)

Personally, I can't see how developing a voting system has any

*technical* challenges. It's all just rules, regulations and politics (and a bit of cronyism, no doubt!).
Reply to
Don Y

Simple!!! Everybody gets chipped. Big Brother tracks you everywhere you go. Checking your location history/statistics verifies that it's you. Two people try to vote with the same chip ID, or just show up in two places with a time difference smaller than the transit time, both get invited to the Trump deportation station to sort it out.

No chip, You can't go anywhere or buy anything and get invited to the Trump deportation station to get chipped or the alternative. Stop and Frisk on steroids.

If we're gonna let Microsoft and Google and Verizon track our every move, and thought, it's a small step to letting Big Brother do it.

We've probably already got the infrastructure in place. All we need are the chips and modifications to the firmware in the NFC readers for credit cards.

Solves a lot more problems than just voter fraud. Might even make America Great Again.

Reply to
mike

All voting systems are flawed; you only mention a very few ways.

Some US systems don't allow verification; the "recount" process is - and by design can /only/ be - "did the computer add up the numbers correctly". That's unacceptable.

As Stalin noted, he didn't have to control how people voted, he only had to control those people that counted the votes.

Reply to
Tom Gardner

te:

word

er disclosed, only used) and a public key. The minimum secure key length wa s 1024 bits - 256 hexadecimal characters - back when I was last paying an i nterest. They are made up as pairs - you don't make up your own secret key.

r the personal identification system which has to be part of a voting syste m) strikes me as difficult.

corded correctly? Presumably you could delete a vote that you regretted or claimed not to have made, but you wouldn't be able to switch it to another candidate.

e can guess that the rest of the program has similar problems.

Everybody is chipped - except identical twins, triplets and so forth.

You DNA is unique, and a cheek swab taken at the voting booth, tied to your voting transaction number, would validate your vote. Even identical twins develop different methylation patterns, and can be separated on this basis .

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It's not yet all that cheap to do, but DNA testing is getting rapidly cheap er, as it has been doing for some time now.

Doesn't follow. The fact that you can be reliably identified doesn't make i t cheap to do reliable identification, or easy for anybody to pick up a DN A sample which can only be yours.

Tricky getting a duplicate DNA identity, including all the right methylatio ns.

No DNA - no person. Non-category.

Google does track quite few of my thoughts - the ones I post here. Not all of them by any means.

Was America ever great? Large, maybe.

--
Bill Sloman, Sydney
Reply to
bill.sloman

this was an interesting reply...

So there is a fundamental spec conflict.

1) You want to be able to keep your vote private. 2) You want to be able to verify that your vote was counted correctly.

But 2 allows you to accept a bribe, which I agree is a bad thing.

How do you allow your vote to be privately verified after the fact, i.e. after all the counting.... but prevent bribing..

Reply to
makolber

On Saturday, December 10, 2016 at 3:46:38 AM UTC+11, snipped-for-privacy@yahoo.com wrot e:

system?

after all the counting.... but prevent bribing..

That's actually perfectly straightforward.

The voting authorities publish the record of who you voted for in a form th at encrypted with your public key - you, and only you can decrypt it with y our secret key.

It's no use for selling your vote unless you are prepared to sell your secr et key at the same time, which would leave you vulnerable in lots of ways, since issuing documents encoded with your secret key which can only be deco ded with your public key would be the method by which you irrevocably signe d and dated stuff (like cheques and contracts).

--
Bill Sloman, Sydney
Reply to
bill.sloman

Den fredag den 9. december 2016 kl. 22.30.40 UTC+1 skrev snipped-for-privacy@ieee.org:

ote:

t system?

. after all the counting.... but prevent bribing..

that encrypted with your public key - you, and only you can decrypt it with your secret key.

cret key at the same time, which would leave you vulnerable in lots of ways , since issuing documents encoded with your secret key which can only be de coded with your public key would be the method by which you irrevocably sig ned and dated stuff (like cheques and contracts).

won't work you don't have to give anyone the key just decrypt and show them

It is vital that it is impossible prove what you voted, or you can sell you vote or be forced or pressured to vote a certain way

Reply to
Lasse Langwadt Christensen

Sure. They're on the bottom half of the glasses (no line). Even before I wore bifocals, I carried reading glasses everywhere I went. It's kinda hard to function, blind.

Many have the eyes set for different distances and let the brain figure it out.

Of course not.

You forget primaries and run-offs.

Which ones?

People really can't read a ballot while it's moving.

Reply to
krw

g:

hat system?

.

.e. after all the counting.... but prevent bribing..

m that encrypted with your public key - you, and only you can decrypt it wi th your secret key.

secret key at the same time, which would leave you vulnerable in lots of wa ys, since issuing documents encoded with your secret key which can only be decoded with your public key would be the method by which you irrevocably s igned and dated stuff (like cheques and contracts).

em

The decrypting process is under your control, as is the secret key you use. There's nothing to stop you using your own public key to fake any number of encrypted records showing you voting anyway you like - the techniques for making the encrypted message identical to the encrypted version the governm ent sent you are tedious but perfectly practical, if you can slip enough "r andom" variation into the decoded output.

--
Bill Sloman, Sydney
Reply to
bill.sloman

e.org:

org:

that system?

ly.

i.e. after all the counting.... but prevent bribing..

orm that encrypted with your public key - you, and only you can decrypt it with your secret key.

r secret key at the same time, which would leave you vulnerable in lots of ways, since issuing documents encoded with your secret key which can only b e decoded with your public key would be the method by which you irrevocably signed and dated stuff (like cheques and contracts).

them

e.

of encrypted records showing you voting anyway you like - the techniques fo r making the encrypted message identical to the encrypted version the gover nment sent you are tedious but perfectly practical, if you can slip enough "random" variation into the decoded output.

tedious - so something no average person will do or know how to do ...

paper ballots work just fine, you can recount if needed, and fraud requires getting rid of and producing pallets of paper

-Lasse

Reply to
Lasse Langwadt Christensen

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