four and a half years. In May 1990, six years before TWA 800, a center tank exploded on a Philippine Airlines 737 shortly before take off, killing eig ht people. Four years and eight months after TWA 800, the center tank of a Thai Airways jet exploded on the ground, killing one person."
their in-flight entertainment system than a fuel tank oxygen removal syste m could ever cost.
terpretation is pathetically naive.
They in fact handed the entire certification off to Boeing with the certifi cation reports being "reviewed" by semi-comatose swivel chair operators wit h probably less than 10% (on the high end) comprehension of what they were reading. And when NYT reports Boeing delivered this or that information to FAA, it only means it was part of a probably huge documentation package mos t of which was simply glossed over by the FAA. As is typical of most politi cized bureaucracies, they're just not going to pay much attention to anythi ng that's not already a high visibility issue.
ic failure mechanism because the pilot is always available to pull the syst em out of MCAS control, and the MCAS was relatively slow acting, taking 10 seconds to do anything. And you can't implement a voting scheme with just t wo sensors. The only good a second sensor would serve is if it was somethin g the pilot could switch in when/if the first sensor gave him trouble with the MCAS.
.Two sensors is just a way of shutting it off if any part of it is not worki ng, cuts the pilot out of the loop. So what happens is you have the pilot, who's banking on MCAS for a successful landing, crashes the aircraft with a bad approach angle. This is what happened to certain crew, whose nationali ty will not be named, that crashed into the pier at San Francisco when they took the ILS offline for a few minutes.