snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
Technically, no, but tons of plane, in the real world, attitude and airspeed is a huge indicator of "stable flight" or a possible lack thereof.
Since, genearally, we fly passenger planes non-inverted, and with all the gravity and inertia 'on the hat', those two indications can tell a person a lot about how the plane is flying.
snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
How many times a day do you contradict yourself?
You have more than once declared both to be non factors.
And you forgot your always wrong sig.
snipped-for-privacy@optonline.net wrote in news:20104676-2e55-4f19-be8e- snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
Easy for you to say.
Jan Panteltje wrote in news:qapnfn$din$2 @dont-email.me:
Yeah... TraderTard4 does not have any clue about real world electrically controlled system development.
He is real good at reading up on things though, so he is all filled up on recent 'findings' etc.
Maybe he'll figure out what 'software' means at some point. And then... maybe... he'll figure that the authers are not just sit on their ass pencil chewing desk jockeys.
Hey FatAssTraderTard4... how much do you weigh?
Lasse Langwadt Christensen wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:
I know what is there. You do not understand my statement.
I do not like an actuator arm locked onto my elevator. That removes my control and an emergency cicumstance does not restore control, it merely gives up as the controlling element. The pilot still then must manually actuate a mecahnism at a much slower rate than needed, to get back to stick control.
If there is one, it needs to have a FULL release and not be a manual screw requiring manual return. If it gets released fully, the pilot's elevator control return is a mere stick push.
Tom Gardner wrote in news:Gb_zE.286379$ snipped-for-privacy@fx13.am:
Was it in a multi-Decaton aircraft?
Define all these declarations to the parameters of flight we are going to be seeing these craft involved in.
"enter a spin"? Please.
bitrex wrote in news:Vy_zE.16$ snipped-for-privacy@fx34.iad:
In that case no human should be piloting any passenger plane. It should all be computers.
No. SOME humans are really bad in panic situations and they do panic. Some humans react differntly to panic situations.
Same thing in billiards. One has shot 5 of 7 balls, and the last two appear to be impossibly hidden at the other end of the table, behind all of the opponents balls.
Do NOT panic. Your 5th ball shot may get your cue ball down ther... or not. The odds that the other guy is not going to run out on you are in your favor slighly. Although you got all of your balls off the table and out of his way, he may still have been dazzled by your first 5 shots and will choke from fear at some point.
The problem here is that you're talking about another piece of equipment that can control the trim, and which might do so when it shouldn't. It would then require switches to disable it. If those are not the switches that already disable the electric trim, then which should the pilots trip when they have a trim issue, bearing in mind that time is of the essence.
So perhaps they trip them all, and the re-enable the trim recovery system, with the intention of getting things back in order, only to discover that that's the system causing the trouble when it makes it even worse.
An out of trim state is perfectly manageable, provided it's not allowed to go too far, and the fact that the manual trim is slow doesn't matter.
Sylvia.
The trim is a normal part of the aircraft's control system, and it doesn't have a fixed correct position to which it could be restored. It has to be adjusted frequently during the flight depending on many factors. In the 737, the trim is adjusted by having the tailplane driven by a jackscrew. The only way that the trim can be restored to its currently correct state after something has driven wrongly it is to turn the jackscrew the other way. Once you've disabled the power to the jackscrew motor, human power is the only way it can be done.
Anything more complicated just introduces other failure modes, and as has been abundantly demonstrated, you don't want things messing with the position of the tailplane.
Sylvia.
It makes sense that the forces required to turn the jackscrew increase with speed, but as I thought the jackscrew was driven by hydraulics and the what the pilots were trying to turn was linked to that and used it for power assist? In which case you'd think that whatever turns the jackscrew would have enough power to move it worst case. The procedure you outline makes sense, but for a runaway trim, that really goes to the limits, many times you would not have the luxury of enough time and altitude to follow it.
With no explanation?
Again, explain to us how any wind shear on this planet, can cause a plane that is in level flight, at 300 MPH, for the last 30 seconds to stall.
Sylvia Else wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@mid.individual.net:
Same equipment, except that instead of a screw jack, it would be a hydraulic cylinder, and THAT cylinder can be made to be 'freed' either in the cylinder valving and design itself or by attachment point or both.
Sylvia Else wrote in news:gjdaubFo46rU1 @mid.individual.net:
Which is why simpling disabling a system that has already driven the setting to the far extreme and requiring the already distracted pilot to manually screw back the setting at one 4th the rate in a panic, is
100% unacceptable.If someone else's arm is on my stick to help. I wany him OFF as soon as I say, not merely still attached and sluggish but no longer physically fighting the pilot to right the plane.
I want his arm removed and immediate full control restored.
And I know it is physically possible.
Agree. Except for the part that MCAS was able to make more significant adjustments than implied by it's specification. Perhaps what you mean is the initial specification that the FAA had and apparently which the FAA was not updated on when the spec was increased to several times what the initial spec called for it to do. That was done when further testing showed more was needed. But apparently now, Boeing says less will do. Hopefully someone will ask them to explain that.
More bizarre nonsense out of thin air.
The entire idea has
Actually while the pilots should be aware of MCAS, there is no need for them to know about it. All they have to do is remember their very basic training on runaway trim. The one pilot in the jump seat on the LA flight did. He told the other pilots that wer flying what to do. They followed the runaway trim procedure, the plane flew on to it's destination. None of them knew about MCAS.
Yes, a chopper offer.
These were not trim tabs, this thing moves the entire
That's a lie, it is only the trim that MCAS uses. That should be obvious from the fact that the procedure to stop it if malfunctions is to disable the electric TRIM.
Wrong, always wrong.
Sylvia Else wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@mid.individual.net:
It most certainly DOES matter once the autotrim element has moved the control surface (not just a trim tab) to the complete opposite extreme.
Time is actually quite critical. And the pilot never needs to be manually screwing anything back in place. A mere decalaration should prompt other cabin personnel to affact whatever orders were given. The plane needs to be designed to operate that way with MAYBE the pilot's last resort being something local to him and slower like a dial crank.
Fly by wire schemas are going to be frought with issues over the next several decades until a proper, trusted redundant control is in place, and the redundancy level made acceptable.
Planes made that require computer assistance are the most dangerous from that perspective, because lone pilot control has thus far been the last resort rule of the day. Bigger planes are not that easy for a pilot to move control surfaces around on.
Sylvia Else wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@mid.individual.net:
You are confusing aircraft basic elements.
trim tabs are small portions of flight surfaces.
The MCAS system here moves the entire elevator on the plane.
That is not a trim tab, and though the operation is technically referred to as trim, in this case it is MAJOR TRIM, not some tiny in flight adjustment made to optimze fuel consumption.
So it is actually NOT 'normal', much less 'normal trim' at all.
Sylvia Else wrote in news:gjdbgdFo8vtU1 @mid.individual.net:
I said nothing about something more complicated.
Having motors turn jacks screws and then expecting pilots to crank them back manually is ludicrous.
Hell if anything, they should have an "invert switch" on it, so the pilot could throw that and the plane would reverse it's manipulation and then flip it back and turn it off at the center point restoring immediate and even assisted full control. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE when an automated control system malfucntions.
It should be hydraulic and releaseable. Not simply "hand resetable" to your magic 'needs to be here to resume' location. Let it control, and if it screws up, REMOVE it 100% from control with no manual dial back requisite. Real simple. Not complex.
Sylvia Else wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@mid.individual.net:
Wake up! That is what MCAS does. It does not move a trim tab. It moves the entire tailplane (elevator).
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