737 Max

On Thursday, March 21, 2019 at 2:28:23 PM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wr ote:

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ork at which time the pilots were not trained to fly the plane. Boeing hid MCAS from the pilots so they would not engage their silly brains on trying to figure out how this plane might actually be different than a 737.

ned off before the crash. I believe we know it wasn't in the Lion Air cras h. The Ethiopia accident data is not yet released.

he same problem and an off duty pilot in the cockpit was able to figure it out and tell the crew to turn off the MCAS. They didn't crash even though they were not trained to fly the plane. Hmmm... funny how that worked out.

ck of the draw as to whether you get a third pilot or not?

37 MAX without additional training. Once the MCAS was turned off the Lion Air pilots were able to fly it in spite of the "different handling characte ristics". You are a troll. You write good sentences but that is all. But let me ask a couple of simple questions and if you give real answers then I will conti nue to engage .

1. Should Boeing have grounded the plane after the second crash? If yes the n why not after the first crash? If no then why not?

Do you believe Boeing hid the MCAS control of the aircraft prior to the fir st crash? If yes then why?

1. Do you think that Boeing made a mistake in the recommended training regi men for 737 pilots to fly the max.

These are really easy and straightforward questions.. If you are just troll ing then fine.

Yes, the report I read had conflated the two flights and people. You're right. It was a pilot in the jump seat for the flight before the fatal flight.

That's the bottom line. The crew wasn't properly experienced and wasn't properly trained to deal with this (or probably ten thousand other) condition.

I disagree. A single point failure of such a small system (AoA sensor) should not require any pilot intervention whatsoever to *prevent* a *crash*. Its insane to allow that to occur. If it was a single engine plane, and the engine failed, you might have a point.

The system was incompletely designed. Period.

-- Kevin Aylward

- SuperSpice

Hear, hear!

--
 Thanks, 
    - Win

ash*.

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You can cheer all you want, that's not the rule in safety systems. The rul e is that no part of the airplane that is REQUIRED to fly the plane must ha ve redundancy. It is not required for systems that you can safely fly the plane without. All they had to do was turn the damn thing off! Period.

Rick C.

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crash*.

and the

ule is that no part of the airplane that is REQUIRED to fly the plane must have redundancy. It is not required for systems that you can safely fly th e plane without. All they had to do was turn the damn thing off! Period.

You are a troll.

On Friday, March 22, 2019 at 12:09:11 PM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@columbus.rr.com wro te:

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*crash*.

, and the

rule is that no part of the airplane that is REQUIRED to fly the plane mus t have redundancy. It is not required for systems that you can safely fly the plane without. All they had to do was turn the damn thing off! Period .

That's what people say when they don't like the facts they hear.

I would correct a type. I meant to say, "The rule is that only parts of th e airplane that are REQUIRED to fly the plane must have redundancy."

Rick C.

Just wondering, from where these Boeing apologists come from :-)

In a critical control system, you never should do any control action, unless you are sure about the input signal validity. Period.

Otherwise you have a GIGO situation.

At least the control system should disable itself automatically, if it is not sure about input validity. After control system disconnect, the pilot should have taken over. Apparently the MCAS was so brain dead that it did not recognize, if inputs were suspect.

If the pilots failed this take-over, we can discuss about pilot incompetence.

Compare this situation with AF447 in which the autopilot was disconnected due to invalid air speed. The junior pilots did not understand what to do and the plane stalled into the Atlantic.

Here's my take on that. The software should be smart enough to see that the pilot is repeatedly over a long period of time trying to counteract what it's doing, and shut itself off.

While we're talking about the software, why would Boeing have an optional LED to tell you the two AOA sensors are differeing? Why not look itself and stop the MCAS thing if the two sensors are in serious disagreement? Thinking of the extreme nose-down attitude the MCAS system puts the plane into, why isn't there a simple tilt sensor to help sort out what's happening? I don't think one would have been tricked by momentum in these situations.

--
 Thanks, 
    - Win

As I understand it , it the "base model" there is only one AoA sensor. The disagreement light is in the upgraded model where you get redundant AoA sensors. So, perhaps one reason these planes crashed in third world countries is because they just bought the "base model".

It just seems that after the first crash they could have identified the limited number of airplanes that had only one AoA sensor and at least focused on those aircraft....but they did not.

As I have said here before, I believe that this dual crash of the max-8 is going to go down as the most negligent series of events in civil aviation in my lifetime.

I would suggest that you should get a job with the FAA and help them do their job. Not many people have the excellent hind sight that you have.

BTW, tilt and AoA are totally different measurements. One is relative to gravity and the other is relative to air flow. Maybe that FAA job isn't in the works for you after all.

Rick C.

There's no gravity in airplanes*, during the flight the thing that keeps you in your seat is the lift from the wings, and that force is referenced to the body of the aircraft, not the ground.

The only thing keeping your feet pointed towards the ground is the pilot/autopilot. Accelerometers (of which a tilt sensor is one kind) won't tell you where the ground is, only where the deck is.

(*) ok somewhat over-simplified, but Einstein's curved spacetime paints a clearer picture here than does Newtonian gravity.

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  When I tried casting out nines I made a hash of it.

Have you ever heard of an attitude indicator? They are standard equipment i n aircraft. Have been for a long time. The m9dern ones use three accelerome ters and or level sensors oriented in three axes. Pilots use them all the time to get a feel for whether they might be flying STAIGHT INTO THE GROUND

nah. they use gyroscopes to drive the display, not accelerometers.

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  When I tried casting out nines I made a hash of it.

Hear, hear!

Pilots should be trained on the aircraft they're flying. I may be like driving a bus most of the time but once in a while it's a lot more. More should be expected.

Huh? Have you ever heard of a 1G roll? An accelerometer won't feel it any more than the pilot does. Keep it up long enough and you

*will* meet the ground. There is a reason that pilots don't rely on their senses to fly airplanes.

snipped-for-privacy@downunder.com wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@4ax.com:

You really do not understand hardware programming.

It is not sentient, ya dope.

The decision factors are the whole thing.

You know... like the pilot's decisions.

The conmtrol system "thought" it was doing exactly what it was told to do... over and over again.

Even your 'hindsight' is f***ed up.

What I read is that there are two AOA sensors but only one feeds data in the MACS system. A single point of failure. Even two are probably not enough. You want four and at least three need to agree.

But even if the AOA sensor(s) fail, the software should detect the pilots trying to repeatedly over-ride the MACS, realize that something is wrong, and at least sound an alarm and light up the switch that they need to throw to turn off MACS.

Having worked on systems where actions based on sensors are taken, you always include code that recognizes when data from a sensor is bogus or non-existent. And even on a non-critical system you have redundant sensors.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out. Will a software fix satisfy regulators, or will they demand that Boeing modify the hardware?

So the 'no-crash' feature is an optional extra?

Cheers

--
Clive