737 Max

They are too well understood. This was a GIGO problem in a control loop.

If there was a fault then it was that no-one ever asked the question: what does MCAS do if the AoA sensor goes bad? The answer is apparently to avoid stalling at all costs by flying the plane into the ground.

I have my suspicions that engineers did ask the question and knew what might happen but the suits overruled them to ship new product sooner.

There are hints that the FAA failed in their oversight of the design.

--
Regards, 
Martin Brown

It is to simple for many engineers not to see it. It is so simple that it points to a poisoning of the technical culture of the company. I suspect t hey will try to pin the blame on some engineer who signed off a drawing and stupidly incriminates himself with some comment like "I had my doubts" in reality though this requires 1000 suits to be let go starting at the top a nd then a reemphasis on fundamentals to the troops. This really rises to th at level.

I like the way that in the absence of evidence, you just make up your own drama.

Rick C.

I was reading a report today that said that in the cockpit voice recorder a third pilot, in the jump seat, correctly diagnosed the problem (and solution) but it wasn't acted upon. Does sound more and more like pilot (or training) error. Human error, in any case. It was a correctable problem. It had been corrected before and could have been in this case.

torsdag den 21. marts 2019 kl. 03.35.37 UTC+1 skrev snipped-for-privacy@notreal.com:

ne

he

more

uy who said the whole thing rests on a single engineer who wrote a crappy c ontrol loop. I was basically saying that if a single engineer can write a loop that brings down a plane then it is not on that guy but rather reflect s a systematic failure in the whole engineering process. I am sure the loo p was vetted

lanes ( 2 of them for God's sake) crashed due to a far more insidious poiso n that has taken hold into Boeing's culture.

g this MCAS design is clear it will be so obviously horrible that any 10 ye ar old will see the folly in it.

. NEVER NEVER NEVER. I know there are engineers at Boeing (not personally but I know corporate culture) that said out loud "We have a situation wher e an AOA failure can crash this plane" And you know what??? the AOA failur e crashed the plane. That is what I am talking about . I am not an aerona utics engineer, but I know that an AOA failure should not crash a plane. I really boils down to this level of non sense. Why did Boeing design a plan e where an AoA senser failure takes the plane down? It is unacceptable. A nd then through some unbelievable convoluted burst of arrogance they encour aged people to keep flying this and a 2nd plane went down

why the planes HAD to crash even assuming this was what happened. The PILO TS could have flown the plane if they did what they were supposed to do. I f you blamed the lack of education or specifically drawing the pilots atten tion to this issue before they entered the planes, then I might agree. But I don't see a problem with the MCAS that meant the plane had to crash when the AoA failed to work.

and, after that first crash

ne

he

more

uy who said the whole thing rests on a single engineer who wrote a crappy c ontrol loop. I was basically saying that if a single engineer can write a loop that brings down a plane then it is not on that guy but rather reflect s a systematic failure in the whole engineering process. I am sure the loo p was vetted

lanes ( 2 of them for God's sake) crashed due to a far more insidious poiso n that has taken hold into Boeing's culture.

g this MCAS design is clear it will be so obviously horrible that any 10 ye ar old will see the folly in it.

. NEVER NEVER NEVER. I know there are engineers at Boeing (not personally but I know corporate culture) that said out loud "We have a situation wher e an AOA failure can crash this plane" And you know what??? the AOA failur e crashed the plane. That is what I am talking about . I am not an aerona utics engineer, but I know that an AOA failure should not crash a plane. I really boils down to this level of non sense. Why did Boeing design a plan e where an AoA senser failure takes the plane down? It is unacceptable. A nd then through some unbelievable convoluted burst of arrogance they encour aged people to keep flying this and a 2nd plane went down

why the planes HAD to crash even assuming this was what happened. The PILO TS could have flown the plane if they did what they were supposed to do. I f you blamed the lack of education or specifically drawing the pilots atten tion to this issue before they entered the planes, then I might agree. But I don't see a problem with the MCAS that meant the plane had to crash when the AoA failed to work.

The article I read talked about a prior flight *in the same plane* where an off duty pilot in the cabin told them how to fix the problem and they *did

• fix it. In fact it seemed to be saying there had been multiple failures on previous flights. This was the Lion Air flight, the first that crashed.

'"It?s simply implausible that this MCAS deficiency by itself can d own a modern jetliner with a trained crew,? Guzzetti said.'

Rick C.

one

the

be more

e

guy who said the whole thing rests on a single engineer who wrote a crappy control loop. I was basically saying that if a single engineer can write a loop that brings down a plane then it is not on that guy but rather refle cts a systematic failure in the whole engineering process. I am sure the l oop was vetted

planes ( 2 of them for God's sake) crashed due to a far more insidious poi son that has taken hold into Boeing's culture.

ing this MCAS design is clear it will be so obviously horrible that any 10 year old will see the folly in it.

ne. NEVER NEVER NEVER. I know there are engineers at Boeing (not personal ly but I know corporate culture) that said out loud "We have a situation wh ere an AOA failure can crash this plane" And you know what??? the AOA fail ure crashed the plane. That is what I am talking about . I am not an aero nautics engineer, but I know that an AOA failure should not crash a plane. I really boils down to this level of non sense. Why did Boeing design a pl ane where an AoA senser failure takes the plane down? It is unacceptable. And then through some unbelievable convoluted burst of arrogance they enco uraged people to keep flying this and a 2nd plane went down

n why the planes HAD to crash even assuming this was what happened. The PI LOTS could have flown the plane if they did what they were supposed to do. If you blamed the lack of education or specifically drawing the pilots att ention to this issue before they entered the planes, then I might agree. B ut I don't see a problem with the MCAS that meant the plane had to crash wh en the AoA failed to work.

That AD is Bullshit as proven by the second crash.

There is a Time and Panik factor. If the Pilot has indefinite time we might Call it a Pilot error. If MCAS gives too Short a Time window... Well...

Airspeed is like the integral of nose pitch, something you need to read from the horizon. nose pitch is the integral of trim. air temperature and density have an effect too....

Yeah it's probably possible given enough sensors to determine when one goes bad, determineing which one could be harder.

--
  When I tried casting out nines I made a hash of it.

An aircraft design should never have a single failure point of one

There are now two counter examples to that claim to prove he is a LIAR!

--
Regards, 
Martin Brown

On Thursday, March 21, 2019 at 1:48:59 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@columbus.rr.com wro te:

of one

of the

d be more

the

he guy who said the whole thing rests on a single engineer who wrote a crap py control loop. I was basically saying that if a single engineer can writ e a loop that brings down a plane then it is not on that guy but rather ref lects a systematic failure in the whole engineering process. I am sure the loop was vetted

se planes ( 2 of them for God's sake) crashed due to a far more insidious p oison that has taken hold into Boeing's culture.

rding this MCAS design is clear it will be so obviously horrible that any 1

0 year old will see the folly in it.

lane. NEVER NEVER NEVER. I know there are engineers at Boeing (not person ally but I know corporate culture) that said out loud "We have a situation where an AOA failure can crash this plane" And you know what??? the AOA fa ilure crashed the plane. That is what I am talking about . I am not an ae ronautics engineer, but I know that an AOA failure should not crash a plane . I really boils down to this level of non sense. Why did Boeing design a plane where an AoA senser failure takes the plane down? It is unacceptable . And then through some unbelievable convoluted burst of arrogance they en couraged people to keep flying this and a 2nd plane went down

son why the planes HAD to crash even assuming this was what happened. The PILOTS could have flown the plane if they did what they were supposed to do . If you blamed the lack of education or specifically drawing the pilots a ttention to this issue before they entered the planes, then I might agree. But I don't see a problem with the MCAS that meant the plane had to crash when the AoA failed to work.

s

I just read the AD more thoroughly. It is a word salad that looks to have been written by lawyers rather than by a company/FAA that was trying to scr eam "fire" about the importance of this. In the light of the second accide nt , this thing is shameful. By shameful I mean it uses euphemisms and is not direct.

On Thursday, March 21, 2019 at 7:47:21 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@columbus.rr.com wro te:

rote:

t of one

e of the

uld be more

g the

the guy who said the whole thing rests on a single engineer who wrote a cr appy control loop. I was basically saying that if a single engineer can wr ite a loop that brings down a plane then it is not on that guy but rather r eflects a systematic failure in the whole engineering process. I am sure t he loop was vetted

hese planes ( 2 of them for God's sake) crashed due to a far more insidious poison that has taken hold into Boeing's culture.

garding this MCAS design is clear it will be so obviously horrible that any 10 year old will see the folly in it.

rplane. NEVER NEVER NEVER. I know there are engineers at Boeing (not pers onally but I know corporate culture) that said out loud "We have a situatio n where an AOA failure can crash this plane" And you know what??? the AOA failure crashed the plane. That is what I am talking about . I am not an aeronautics engineer, but I know that an AOA failure should not crash a pla ne. I really boils down to this level of non sense. Why did Boeing design a plane where an AoA senser failure takes the plane down? It is unacceptab le. And then through some unbelievable convoluted burst of arrogance they encouraged people to keep flying this and a 2nd plane went down

eason why the planes HAD to crash even assuming this was what happened. Th e PILOTS could have flown the plane if they did what they were supposed to do. If you blamed the lack of education or specifically drawing the pilots attention to this issue before they entered the planes, then I might agree . But I don't see a problem with the MCAS that meant the plane had to cras h when the AoA failed to work.

nd

was

e been written by lawyers rather than by a company/FAA that was trying to s cream "fire" about the importance of this. In the light of the second acci dent , this thing is shameful. By shameful I mean it uses euphemisms and i s not direct.

Further more, Boeing should have sent out a representative for every MAX-8 aircraft in the field and made sure every pilot got individual training on how to prevent this. Oh, that is too much you say? That would have cost m aybe 10 million dollars. I am sure that if they could go back in time.....

The kicker about this is that all of this was predictable and I am certain was predicted by individuals within Boeing. When a plane crashes because t he redundant hydrophilic line is placed too close to the main line a reason able person can say..."wow that was an unexpected event" Aviation crashes that take place due to something that is new or not thought of is the price we pay to fly....but this was predictable and the second crash is just bey ond unbelievable.

snipped-for-privacy@columbus.rr.com wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

MCAS has been in use for millions of miles of flight... decades!

All of a sudden we have pilots unable to fly the planes... these planes.

Thousands of pilots, many of which are not versed in English as well as they should be... are being put at the helm of thousands of aircraft. They all fly finem but these two crashed.

So, the MCAS is too robust for an untrained pilot.

So, MCAS software update, ang HUGE pilot training update, in an area not previously emphasized enough.

Boeing said the plane fly like a 737. It does until MCAS does not work at w hich time the pilots were not trained to fly the plane. Boeing hid MCAS fro m the pilots so they would not engage their silly brains on trying to figur e out how this plane might actually be different than a 737.

can

You seem to love jumping to conclusions. I'm glad you aren't on a jury. Y ou would be ready to hang someone as soon as opening statements were read.

How about waiting to condemn anyone until the accident report is out and we have all the facts?

Rick C.

On Thursday, March 21, 2019 at 7:54:02 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@columbus.rr.com wro te:

rote:

ave been written by lawyers rather than by a company/FAA that was trying to scream "fire" about the importance of this. In the light of the second ac cident , this thing is shameful. By shameful I mean it uses euphemisms and is not direct.

8 aircraft in the field and made sure every pilot got individual training o n how to prevent this. Oh, that is too much you say? That would have cost maybe 10 million dollars. I am sure that if they could go back in time... ..

Monday morning quarterbacks... Why weren't you posting this after the firs t accident?

n was predicted by individuals within Boeing. When a plane crashes because the redundant hydrophilic line is placed too close to the main line a reas onable person can say..."wow that was an unexpected event" Aviation crashe s that take place due to something that is new or not thought of is the pri ce we pay to fly....but this was predictable and the second crash is just b eyond unbelievable.

"Certain"... that's impressive.

R

On Thursday, March 21, 2019 at 8:34:51 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@columbus.rr.com wr ote:

which time the pilots were not trained to fly the plane. Boeing hid MCAS f rom the pilots so they would not engage their silly brains on trying to fig ure out how this plane might actually be different than a 737.

That may be true and would be important if the MCAS had ever been turned of f before the crash. I believe we know it wasn't in the Lion Air crash. Th e Ethiopia accident data is not yet released.

Oh, but we know a flight prior to the Lion Air flight did encounter the sam e problem and an off duty pilot in the cockpit was able to figure it out an d tell the crew to turn off the MCAS. They didn't crash even though they w ere not trained to fly the plane. Hmmm... funny how that worked out.

Rick C.

On Thursday, March 21, 2019 at 11:11:06 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com w rote:

l

at which time the pilots were not trained to fly the plane. Boeing hid MCAS from the pilots so they would not engage their silly brains on trying to f igure out how this plane might actually be different than a 737.

off before the crash. I believe we know it wasn't in the Lion Air crash. The Ethiopia accident data is not yet released.

ame problem and an off duty pilot in the cockpit was able to figure it out and tell the crew to turn off the MCAS. They didn't crash even though they were not trained to fly the plane. Hmmm... funny how that worked out.

And your point is that these planes should fly or crash based on the luck o f the draw as to whether you get a third pilot or not?

On Thursday, March 21, 2019 at 11:08:11 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com w rote:

rote:

have been written by lawyers rather than by a company/FAA that was trying to scream "fire" about the importance of this. In the light of the second accident , this thing is shameful. By shameful I mean it uses euphemisms a nd is not direct.

X-8 aircraft in the field and made sure every pilot got individual training on how to prevent this. Oh, that is too much you say? That would have co st maybe 10 million dollars. I am sure that if they could go back in time. ....

rst accident?

Random crashes happen now and again. I do not ever recall an aircraft havin g crashed for such a obvious oversight followed up by a directive to carry on and fly the plane which was followed by a second crash. This second cra sh is probably the most disgraceful event in civil aviation my lifetime. T hese failure modes were under the noses of anyone who wanted to see them . Seriously? a sensor that is there to aid the pilot fails and it crashes the aircraft. And then they do it a second time!

ain was predicted by individuals within Boeing. When a plane crashes becau se the redundant hydrophilic line is placed too close to the main line a re asonable person can say..."wow that was an unexpected event" Aviation cras hes that take place due to something that is new or not thought of is the p rice we pay to fly....but this was predictable and the second crash is just beyond unbelievable.