On Tuesday, March 19, 2019 at 8:03:43 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@downunder.com wrot e:
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he MCAS design even when the actual failure was in the AoA sensor.
Then your issue is with the aviation industry, not just Boeing.
It's not like the airplane jettisoned the fuel or stopped the engines or so mething else that would pretty much be unstoppably fatal. The AoA sensor f ailed BEFORE take off, the MCAS responded in a dangerous way and the pilots failed to handle the situation appropriately.
Yes, there are other things they can do in the MCAS to help minimize the ch ances of this happening again.
The Seattle Times seems to have their finger on the pulse of this for obvio us reasons. In fact, they filed paperwork with Boeing and the FAA about th is issue four days before the second accident. Interesting...
suspect the airplane was not flyable.
"It"??? "It" was consistent. The AoA failed and the MCAS operates badly w hen that happens... consistently. I think I'm missing your point.
The training should be up to snuff on ALL pilots and all flights. Why shou ld a lack of training be tolerated and more than the operation of the plane ???
I believe the co-pilot is trained to fly the plane. No? That's his purpos e.
airport. Had these pilots been on top of their game there is no reason to suspect they could have not also done the same thing. We will know more o nce the accident report is made public.
Test pilot??? You are in another universe. EVERY pilot in the cockpit sho uld be able to fly the plane or he shouldn't be there.
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apable of "crashing the airplane" unless the pilot is not aware of what is happening. The pilots can compensate for the MCAS or turn it off.
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utomated control. There are two of these sensors, but there seems to be no sanity checking.
use of the MCAS and we have seen in the reporting that there are instructio ns on what to do to deal with the MCAS not working right. So clearly they did plan for this eventuality.
By system you mean pilot? All they had to do was look at the other AoA sen sor. I don't recall the details of the Lion Air flight, but a flight that crashed because of a faulty air speed indication from a clogged pitot tube (faulty ground maintenance was suspected) showed the pilot wrong numbers an d he asked the co-pilot to call out from his air speed indicator. Once off the ground the pilot's indicator increased the reading and he started to t rust it rather than read the other TWO indicators where he could have picke d two our of three that agreed.
There are only two AoA sensors, but your third is what you see from the win dow. If you see ground in front of you, your angle of attack mostly likely is not too positive.
urn off the MCAS???
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out a rational discussion?
His arguments are flawed for several reasons, the biggest one being that we don't have the accident report yet. But my comment was not about his argu ment, but his language. "dangerous automatic safety system" is just fear m ongering. Another flaw in his argument is that by the aviation rules havin g a disable switch *is* an acceptable way to mitigate the possibility of th e MCAS malfunctioning. Ask the aviation industry. I'm pretty sure they ha ve fairly similar rules across the globe or international air travel would be very, very difficult.
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Yes, apparently not and this is something I expect will be addressed regard less of the ultimate cause of the crashes. I'm not so certain that turning the system off is appropriate. In reality they should have three sensors so the system has an idea of what is right.
re. They shut them down. They have many circuit breakers through out the cabin to turn off malfunctioning equipment. This is standard procedure.
The plane doesn't start out "pogos up and down". It starts putting the nos e down and the pilot corrects with a thumbwheel. The process repeats, mult iple times before the plane goes into a dive. The pilot should immediately know the MCAS needs to be turned off in addition to other potential causes . This is clearly explained in the article linked above.
But why did it get to that point? Why didn't the pilot notice the AoA read ing was bogus???
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You need to remember that this system isn't "controlling" the airplane. It is trimming the elevator. The pilot can override it and if the MCAS conti nues to do the same thing repeatedly, it can be turned off. This is not li ke a full self driving car or an automated assembly line. The pilot is sup posed to be aware and in control at all times.
Ok, I don't know what that title is supposed to mean. Operators in nuclear power plants get a lot of training as well and yet they make mistakes. Wh at is your point?
Going outside the evidence, I think Boeing did screw up, but it isn't in th e design of the MCAS. I think they failed to underline the importance of k nowing how to handle this event and the pilots failed to pick up on the not ices that were sent out. I would have no concerns flying on the 737 MAX ju st the way it is if the pilots are correctly trained.
Rick C.