737 Max

Civil liability suits could sink Boeing. There are two issues: strict liability with large payouts, and forum changes to send the suits outside the US, which has juries that tend to give large settlements. The risks are huge.

Who will win?

== Mar 18, 2019

Relatives of 737 Max crash victims will have strong case for damages, expert says

By Jim Puzzanghera

The fatal crashes of two Boeing Co. 737 Max jets and the fleet's worldwide grounding have triggered a complicated scramble regarding legal liability involving the manufacturer, airlines and the victims' families.

Boeing's risks might be rising after a report in the Seattle Times that the company's safety analysis for the airliner's new flight control system had crucial flaws. Much of the legal liability depends on the findings of investigators, as well as the contracts Boeing has with airlines that purchased the planes.

But one thing so far appears clear: The families of passengers who perished in the crashes of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10 and Lion Air Flight 610 in October will have strong claims for damages. Questions remain, however, about whether some of those legal cases will be heard in the US or abroad.

"They are in a sense the innocent participants in the whole thing, and it's really a function of when and how much" the families receive in damages - "and not if," said Mark A. Dombroff, an attorney with law firm LeClairRyan in Alexandria, Va., who often represents airlines.

Robert L. Rabin, a Stanford law professor and expert on accident law, said there were a variety of types of legal claims possible against Boeing. They include product liability for defects in the airplane or its flight control system and negligence for not training pilots on the changes to the system and not taking steps to fix any problems after the first crash.

"If US law is applicable," he said, "the case for liability, from what we know now, would be pretty strong."

Several lawsuits already have been filed against Boeing by families of victims of the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 passengers and crew on board when it plunged into the Java Sea minutes after takeoff from the Indonesian capital of Jakarta.

More lawsuits are expected after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which killed all 157 on board. Both flights involved Boeing 737 Max airliners. Regulators have grounded the jets because of similarities between the crashes, and Boeing is working on a fix to the flight-control software.

Families of victims of the second crash could have stronger legal claims because there was already the fatal October crash involving the 737 Max, Rabin said.

Boeing declined to comment Monday on its potential liability, with a spokesman saying the Chicago company "does not respond to or comment on questions concerning legal matters, whether internal, litigation, or governmental inquiries."

Federal prosecutors and the Department of Transportation's inspector general reportedly are investigating the design certification process for the 737 Max.

The chief executive of Norwegian Air said last week the European airline would send a bill to Boeing for the costs of the lost flights. Boeing 737 Max planes account for 18 of Norwegian Air's 160 aircraft.

But Boeing could avoid payments related to the grounding.

Aviation insurance covers such losses. Boeing and the airlines may have that coverage, Dombroff said.

There also are warranties and other provisions in contracts between Boeing and the airlines that govern claims. Boeing might only be required to fix the problems with the jets, and any other disputes could be required to go to private arbitration, Dombroff said.

"The first thing everybody undoubtedly is looking at is the contracts, the warranties and limitations of liabilities," he said.

Airlines usually are hesitant to file lawsuits against manufacturers, particularly because Boeing is one of only two major jet makers in the world, along with Airbus, Dombroff said.

"Does the airline want to get into a public dispute with the manufacturer whose airplanes they're flying?" he said. "How does that impact the future relationship between the manufacturer and the airline?"

Southwest Airlines has 34 737 Max jets, the most of any US airline, and said it would not disclose the specifics of its Boeing contracts.

"As you would expect, we are in constant contact with Boeing following the Ethiopian Air accident and subsequent 737 Max 8 grounding," said Chris Mainz, a Southwest spokesman.

"We are Boeing's largest customer of the 737, and we have a long history of working together with Boeing, and this is no different," he said. "But we won't be reporting out on the details of those ongoing conversations."

Boeing's bigger legal liability worries come from the fatal crashes.

Families of the crash victims can seek compensation from the airlines and the manufacturer of the jets. Complex international rules govern where lawsuits against airlines can be filed. Under an international treaty, damages from airlines for the families of victims of crashes of international flights are capped at about $170,000.

Airlines often resolve such lawsuits with passengers, then seek compensation from the manufacturer if the crash involves equipment failures and not pilot error, Dombroff said.

But there is no cap on damages in lawsuits from passengers against a jet maker. And there's an advantage for foreign passengers to file those lawsuits in the US, where courts are more likely to award significant damages, Dombroff said.

Lawsuits against Boeing by US victims of the crashes would have to be tried here. But Boeing is likely to push to have lawsuits by victims from other countries adjudicated in the nation where the airline resides, Dombroff said.

Several lawsuits already have been filed in Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois by families or the estates of crash victims. Boeing's corporate headquarters are there, and the court has a reputation for being friendly to plaintiffs, Dombroff said.

Boeing's lawyers have used a legal right to move some of those cases to the federal US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago, court records show.

Companies involved in air crashes and other disasters usually are eager to settle wrongful-death lawsuits to get the incident and negative publicity behind them, Rabin said.

"There would be strong incentives, I think, for Boeing to enter into settlements of the wrongful-death cases," he said.

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190318-story.html

==

Mar 18, 2019

Relatives of 737 Max crash victims will have strong case for damages, expert says

By Jim Puzzanghera

The fatal crashes of two Boeing Co. 737 Max jets and the fleet's worldwide grounding have triggered a complicated scramble regarding legal liability involving the manufacturer, airlines and the victims' families.

Boeing's risks might be rising after a report in the Seattle Times that the company's safety analysis for the airliner's new flight control system had crucial flaws. Much of the legal liability depends on the findings of investigators, as well as the contracts Boeing has with airlines that purchased the planes.

But one thing so far appears clear: The families of passengers who perished in the crashes of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10 and Lion Air Flight 610 in October will have strong claims for damages. Questions remain, however, about whether some of those legal cases will be heard in the US or abroad.

"They are in a sense the innocent participants in the whole thing, and it's really a function of when and how much" the families receive in damages - "and not if," said Mark A. Dombroff, an attorney with law firm LeClairRyan in Alexandria, Va., who often represents airlines.

Robert L. Rabin, a Stanford law professor and expert on accident law, said there were a variety of types of legal claims possible against Boeing. They include product liability for defects in the airplane or its flight control system and negligence for not training pilots on the changes to the system and not taking steps to fix any problems after the first crash.

"If US law is applicable," he said, "the case for liability, from what we know now, would be pretty strong."

Several lawsuits already have been filed against Boeing by families of victims of the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 passengers and crew on board when it plunged into the Java Sea minutes after takeoff from the Indonesian capital of Jakarta.

More lawsuits are expected after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which killed all 157 on board. Both flights involved Boeing 737 Max airliners. Regulators have grounded the jets because of similarities between the crashes, and Boeing is working on a fix to the flight-control software.

Families of victims of the second crash could have stronger legal claims because there was already the fatal October crash involving the 737 Max, Rabin said.

Boeing declined to comment Monday on its potential liability, with a spokesman saying the Chicago company "does not respond to or comment on questions concerning legal matters, whether internal, litigation, or governmental inquiries."

Federal prosecutors and the Department of Transportation's inspector general reportedly are investigating the design certification process for the 737 Max.

The chief executive of Norwegian Air said last week the European airline would send a bill to Boeing for the costs of the lost flights. Boeing 737 Max planes account for 18 of Norwegian Air's 160 aircraft.

But Boeing could avoid payments related to the grounding.

Aviation insurance covers such losses. Boeing and the airlines may have that coverage, Dombroff said.

There also are warranties and other provisions in contracts between Boeing and the airlines that govern claims. Boeing might only be required to fix the problems with the jets, and any other disputes could be required to go to private arbitration, Dombroff said.

"The first thing everybody undoubtedly is looking at is the contracts, the warranties and limitations of liabilities," he said.

Airlines usually are hesitant to file lawsuits against manufacturers, particularly because Boeing is one of only two major jet makers in the world, along with Airbus, Dombroff said.

"Does the airline want to get into a public dispute with the manufacturer whose airplanes they're flying?" he said. "How does that impact the future relationship between the manufacturer and the airline?"

Southwest Airlines has 34 737 Max jets, the most of any US airline, and said it would not disclose the specifics of its Boeing contracts.

"As you would expect, we are in constant contact with Boeing following the Ethiopian Air accident and subsequent 737 Max 8 grounding," said Chris Mainz, a Southwest spokesman.

"We are Boeing's largest customer of the 737, and we have a long history of working together with Boeing, and this is no different," he said. "But we won't be reporting out on the details of those ongoing conversations."

Boeing's bigger legal liability worries come from the fatal crashes.

Families of the crash victims can seek compensation from the airlines and the manufacturer of the jets. Complex international rules govern where lawsuits against airlines can be filed. Under an international treaty, damages from airlines for the families of victims of crashes of international flights are capped at about $170,000.

Airlines often resolve such lawsuits with passengers, then seek compensation from the manufacturer if the crash involves equipment failures and not pilot error, Dombroff said.

But there is no cap on damages in lawsuits from passengers against a jet maker. And there's an advantage for foreign passengers to file those lawsuits in the US, where courts are more likely to award significant damages, Dombroff said.

Lawsuits against Boeing by US victims of the crashes would have to be tried here. But Boeing is likely to push to have lawsuits by victims from other countries adjudicated in the nation where the airline resides, Dombroff said.

Several lawsuits already have been filed in Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois by families or the estates of crash victims. Boeing's corporate headquarters are there, and the court has a reputation for being friendly to plaintiffs, Dombroff said.

Boeing's lawyers have used a legal right to move some of those cases to the federal US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago, court records show.

Companies involved in air crashes and other disasters usually are eager to settle wrongful-death lawsuits to get the incident and negative publicity behind them, Rabin said.

"There would be strong incentives, I think, for Boeing to enter into settlements of the wrongful-death cases," he said.

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190318-story.html ==
Reply to
Steve Wilson
Loading thread data ...

Lift is ambient air pressure under the wing, minus the pressure on the curved upper surface of the wing . The two don't balance at forward airspeed because of the Bernoulli effect.

Reply to
whit3rd

Representative democracy works by our elected representatives, in congress, making decisions. A single individual with no respect for those decisions caused the shutdown. His misdeed is not excused by any of the surrounding circumstances.

Reply to
whit3rd

Turning MCAS off might well have made the plane more airworthy than leaving the damn thing switched on. The root of the problem is that for some reason when the transition from flaps and lift enhancers to normal flight whilst climbing the 737 Max aircraft tends to lift its nose up.

MCAS is a quick and ugly bodge to prevent that happening. TBH I don't understand why they couldn't have altered the existing flight control algorithms to compensate for and null out the unwanted net torque.

Or for that matter why it doesn't sanity check its results against the artificial horizon (or was that also compromised by the AoA sensor).

How a control system with a single point of failure capable of crashing planes during take off got through the FAA approval is a mystery to me. Looks like they may have delegated it to Boeing though:

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More is leaking out as internal documents get to the Seattle Times (in fact they had this just prior to the accident). Business insider has a short summary too - if true it doesn't look good for Boeing or the FAA:

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It was a failure to engineer the required redundancy and robustness into the sensor and MCAS control systems. Possibly a failure of the cockpit HCI too when the plane decided that it was in trouble it compounded the problem by making things worse by giving too many warnings at once and resisting all the pilots best efforts to bring the nose back up again.

That there was a switch for "disable the dangerous automatic safety system" is not an excuse for having such a serious fault in an aircraft.

You should not fear innovation but equally you should not use that as an excuse to design safety critical control systems that are not fault tolerant. We provided a switch to disable it just isn't good enough.

This 737 fail is in the same league as an automotive brake management system that locks up a wheel completely if it detects low tire pressure. (or to make it even more arbitrary a parking light sensor failure)

--
Regards, 
Martin Brown
Reply to
Martin Brown

Yes, you don't understand. But that doesn't stop you from criticizing the MCAS design even when the actual failure was in the AoA sensor.

As I have pointed out a number of times, there is presently no reason to su spect the airplane was not flyable. Other pilots have experienced this iss ue and flown the plane back to the airport. Had these pilots been on top o f their game there is no reason to suspect they could have not also done th e same thing. We will know more once the accident report is made public.

Again, you continue to make the same errors in logic. The MCAS is not capa ble of "crashing the airplane" unless the pilot is not aware of what is hap pening. The pilots can compensate for the MCAS or turn it off.

r-crash/

I can't argue the sensor shouldn't have had redundancy if used with an auto mated control. There are two of these sensors, but there seems to be no sa nity checking. I expect a failure in the AoA sensor was considered in the planning for use of the MCAS and we have seen in the reporting that there a re instructions on what to do to deal with the MCAS not working right. So clearly they did plan for this eventuality.

Why do you not ask why the pilots did not take the correct measures to turn off the MCAS???

Now you are just being a fear monger with inflammatory language. How about a rational discussion?

Why? That's what they do with engines that are in danger of catching fire. They shut them down. They have many circuit breakers through out the cab in to turn off malfunctioning equipment. This is standard procedure.

Hmmm... more irrational illogic pandering to the emotions.

Rick C.

Reply to
gnuarm.deletethisbit

My unqualified speculation is that someone coded the PID loop poorly.

--
Boris
Reply to
Boris Mohar

'Boeing insists that the pilots on the Lion Air flight should have recogniz ed that the horizontal stabilizer was moving uncommanded, and should have r esponded with a standard pilot checklist procedure to handle what?s called ?stabilizer runaway.?

If they?d done so, the pilots would have hit cutoff switches and de activated the automatic stabilizer movement.

Boeing has pointed out that the pilots flying the same plane on the day bef ore the crash experienced similar behavior to Flight 610 and did exactly th at: They threw the stabilizer cutoff switches, regained control and continu ed with the rest of the flight.'

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crash/

So why were pilots not aware of this procedure? Or was the problem that th ey just didn't do what they were supposed to do?

Rick C.

Reply to
gnuarm.deletethisbit

An aircraft design should never have a single failure point of one engineer coding a loop badly. That is a systematic failure of the whole engineering process of Boeing.

Reply to
blocher

On Tuesday, March 19, 2019 at 6:19:23 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wro te:

ized that the horizontal stabilizer was moving uncommanded, and should have responded with a standard pilot checklist procedure to handle what? ?s called ?stabilizer runaway.?

deactivated the automatic stabilizer movement.

efore the crash experienced similar behavior to Flight 610 and did exactly that: They threw the stabilizer cutoff switches, regained control and conti nued with the rest of the flight.'

r-crash/

they just didn't do what they were supposed to do?

One of the reasons that the pilots missed it was because Boeing MARKETED th is aircraft as another 737 which allows the pilots to sit right into the ma x variety with very little new training. The MCAS system was the magic box that made the new 737 handle like the old 737. This MARKETING GIMMICK led the pilots to believe that this flys like the old 737. The literature prio r to the Lions crash did not mention the MCAS so it was a roll of the dice as to whether the pilots would figure out how to disable the system that th ey potentially did not even know existed . The MCAS info was deliberately with held from the pilots up until Lions. And After Lions , Boeing either d id not adequately get the information out to other airlines or there is som e other subtle thing going on that Boeing did not fully understand after th e Lion crash

Reply to
blocher

If we believe the Seatle Times article that a _single_ AoA sensor was used to drive the critical MCAS system, then that is a huge incompetence !!

The AoA sensor is essentially a vane turning a potentiometer. The vane could be damaged, there might be icing, there might be lubrication problems or the potentiometer might be noisy. If some digital encoder is used, a missing bit can cause havoc etc.

It is inexcusable to use a single sensor in such critical situations.

Since pilots with different amount of training and experience is expected to able to fly the plane, it should act consistently.

Consider a situation with an experienced captain and a novice with 100 hours on type and the captain gets an hear attach, the 100 hour co-pilot should be able to safely land the plane.

While a test pilot might be able to do this, with the rapid growth of aviation, there are always going to be novice pilots. If you are killed prematurely, you are not going to collect experience :-).

The only thing needed was to turn off MCAS when an AoA failure is detected. The question is, was the system able to detect the AoA failure ? Apparently not.

What is wrong with Martin Brown's arguments ? Boeing messed up really badly.

If the control system notices a GiGo (Garbage in Garbage out) situation, it should automatically turn the control system off. In this case, the question is, did the MCAS even detect that there was something wrong with AoA sensor, apparently not.

When the plane pogos up and down, finding and disabling the correct circuit breaker is a challenge.

I have been involved in safety critical control systems for years and one important thing always to remember that you have reliable input signals before controlling anything critical.

Regarding airline pilots, they are just glorified industrial control operators, most of the time the job is extremely boring, but once something special happens, you are expected to act quickly nd correctly. Both in aviation as well as in some industrial control system operator training, simulators are used to train for events that can't be normally done. After all, Boeing screwed up badly !

Reply to
upsidedown

Bonk wrote in news:q6pik6$1g1r$ snipped-for-privacy@gioia.aioe.org:

No. The 'wings' are on the left and the right of the fuselage. There is a big Aluminum casting, the main element of the aircraft, that both the fuselage and the wings are attached to.

Go play in six lanes of LA rush our traffic, putz.

Reply to
DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno

er coding a loop badly. That is a systematic failure of the whole engineer ing process of Boeing.

You need to take that up with the aviation industry. If you read the artic les about this the single point of failure with the ability of the pilot to override the system is an acceptable system in an airplane. It does appea r that the FAA failed to question the issue of the impact of the failure. It was listed as Hazardous rather than Catastrophic which is clearly what h as proven to be true... assuming the MCAS proves to be the problem.

I find it interesting that no one has questioned why the AoA failed in at l east three of the 737 MAX flights apparently on take off. Is this not insp ected prior to flight??? If they are that prone to failure, eventually a p lane will take off with both not working and then they'll be royally screwe d no matter what the MCAS does.

Rick C.

Reply to
gnuarm.deletethisbit

Steve Wilson wrote in news:XnsAA17245802173idtokenpost@

69.16.179.22:

Most of which will settle for couple mil each.

Reply to
DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno

whit3rd wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

That pressure is ONLY achieved when the air is moving. The wing, moving through the air is the ONLY way that pressure differential gets generated. The diagram with the laminar lines represents air at a specific pressure. The diagram of what happens as the wing moves forward through that air is the key to achieving that, and the AOA is what sets up the differential. The reduced pressure on the top side of the wing is where the lift is. The impinging air mass on the underside of the wing is NOT. It is slightly complimentary, but the top side and that lower pressure is what draws the wing upward through that aformentioned laminar airflow.

That AOA means nothing without forward movement of the wing through said air AT SPEED.

Planes stay on the tarmac in a calm (or even heavy)breeze. It takes several hundred feet per second of air mass moving over that wing for it to generate lift... enough to lift the craft the wing is attached to.

Reply to
DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno

The only problem for using double or triple redundant sensors in aviation (and space) is weight. However, the plane already had two AoA sensors, why on earth was only one used ?

A third AoA sensor somewhere in a tail would not have increased the weight significantly.

With the large number of air speed and AoA sensor failures and some bad crashes caused by this, it is astonishing that no more sensor reliability design has not been done.

Reply to
upsidedown

whit3rd wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

+infinity
Reply to
DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno

On Tuesday, March 19, 2019 at 8:40:23 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@downunder.com wrot e:

rote:

he

y

.

ineer coding a loop badly. That is a systematic failure of the whole engin eering process of Boeing.

This is not about redundancy of aoa sensors. The plane is flyable with no a oa. So philosophically you better not let something that is not needed to k eep the plane flying cause a plane to crash.

e ability of the pilot to override the system is an acceptable system in an airplane. It does appear that the FAA failed to question the issue of the impact of the failure. It was listed as Hazardous rather than Catastrophi c which is clearly what has proven to be true... assuming the MCAS proves t o be the problem.

t least three of the 737 MAX flights apparently on take off. Is this not i nspected prior to flight??? If they are that prone to failure, eventually a plane will take off with both not working and then they'll be royally scr ewed no matter what the MCAS does.

Reply to
bulegoge

snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wrote in news: snipped-for-privacy@googlegroups.com:

No. The failure was in the software that activated control systems based on a single sensor, and the absence of a kill switch when said control goes rogue.

Sure, it will come down to a failed AOA sensor, but the real fail here is how the system responded, the lack of a redundant unit (if that is true), and the fact that said AOA sensor must be an untested new design, because they have been in use for decades and so has automated control 'assistance'.

So, it will end up a software fail where the failure mode was not encountered during ANY of the testing that took place on the airframe before it was approved.

Kind of hard to blame them for making systems to make up/keep us safer just because of a failure mode that did not get caught.

Look at the rarity of such things in the industry.

Come on, guys... this is like a 0.001% thing. These guys are the best pros our nation has.

Don't go all Donald J. Trump stupid f*ck on us.

Reply to
DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno

snipped-for-privacy@downunder.com wrote: [...]

That, in a nutshell, is the essential point of any control system: Consistency. The unfortunate tendency is to abuse the endless possibilities of sophisticated informatics to confuse things, mostly by accident, but sometimes intentionally!. That is as true for cars and industrial plants as it is for airplanes. A good control system never does anything unexpected.

Jeroen Belleman

Reply to
Jeroen Belleman

On Tuesday, March 19, 2019 at 6:19:23 AM UTC-4, snipped-for-privacy@gmail.com wro te:

ized that the horizontal stabilizer was moving uncommanded, and should have responded with a standard pilot checklist procedure to handle what? ?s called ?stabilizer runaway.?

deactivated the automatic stabilizer movement.

efore the crash experienced similar behavior to Flight 610 and did exactly that: They threw the stabilizer cutoff switches, regained control and conti nued with the rest of the flight.'

r-crash/

they just didn't do what they were supposed to do?

My question is if the same plane experienced the problem on a previous fli ght why was the AOA sensor not replaced ? And why did the pilots not in form the next crew of the problem?

Dan

Reply to
dcaster

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